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ROMAN CANON LAW IN THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH
CHURCH: STUBBS VS. MAITLAND RE-EXAMINED

AFTER 75 YEARS IN THE LIGHT OF SOME
RECORDS FROM THE CHURCH COURTSf
Charles Donahue, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE Right Reverend William Stubbs, D.D. (1825-1901), was the
Anglican Bishop of Oxford, sometime Regius Professor of
Modem History at Oxford, and a scholar of considerable repute.1
His Constitutional History of England2 was, until quite recently,
the standard work in the field, and his editions of texts for the Rolls
Series3 leave no doubt that he spent long hours ·with basic source
material. Frederic William Maitland, M.A. (1850-1906), was an
agnostic, the Downing Professor of the Laws of England at Cambridge, and a scholar whose reputation during his life was perhaps
not so wide as Stubbs' but whose work commanded the instant respect of those who knew it.4 Maitland's History of English Law Be-

T

t Research for this Article was supported in part by the Ford Foundation Fund
for International Legal Studies and the W.W. Cook Fund, both administered by The
University of Michigan School of Law. I would like to thank the Borthwick. Institute
of Historical Research and the Dean and Chapter of Canterbury for permission to
cite and reproduce records in their respective custodies herein. I would also like to
thank Mrs. N.K.M. Gurney, Director, and Dr. D.M. Smith, Acting Director, of the
Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, York; Miss Anne M. Oakley, Archivist of
the Cathedral Archives and Library, Canterbury; and Miss K.M. Longley, Archivist
of the Dean and Chapter Library, York, for many kindnesses; the Reverend
Michael Walsh, S.J., for allowing me to use the splendid collection of printed canon
law material at Heythrop College, London; Professor Norma Adams for the use of
her transcription of the Picheford case; Miss Rita Burns for help in checking citations;
and Professors Thomas Green and R.H. Helmholz for many helpful suggestions for
correction, rewriting, and clarification. An earlier version of this paper was read at an
interdisciplinary seminar at the University of London's Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies, and I benefited much from the stimulating discussion that followed. Of course,
no one but me bears the responsibility for the errors and infelicities that remain in
the piece.
As this Article was going to press, I received from England the sad news of Mrs.
Gurney's untimely death. I regret I have nothing better; I offer this, an indignum
donum, to her memory.
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1962, Harvard University; LL.B.
1965, Yale University.-Ed.
1. 3 DxcrIONARY oF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY William Stubbs 444 (Supp. 1912).
2. '\V. STUBBS, THE CoNSI'ITOTIONAL HlsTORY OF ENGLAND IN !Ts ORIGIN AND DEVELOP•
MENT (5th ed. 1891). For a recent attack on Stubbs' Constitutional History, see H.
RICHARDSON &: G. SAYLES, THE GoVERNANCE OF MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND FROM: THE CONQUEST
TO MAGNA CARTA (1963).
3. For a general description of the series and a listing of Stubbs' contributions
to it, see E. MUI.LINS, TEx.Ts AND CALENDARS: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO SERIAL PUBLI•
CATIONS 49-56 (Royal Historical Soc., Guides &: Handbooks No. 7, 1958).
4. 2 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY Frederic Maitland 552 (Supp. 1912).
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fore the Time of Edward 15 is still, in many ways, the standard work
in the field, and his editions of texts for the Selden Society0 leave no
doubt that he, too, was a man who knew the basic source material,
Believing churchman vs. agnostic lawyer, constitutional and ecclesiastical historian vs. legal and constitutional historian, editor of
chronicles vs. editor of legal documents, professor at Oxford vs. professor at Cambridge-what more fitting pair to debate the question of
the authority of the "Roman canon law" in medieval England?
The best known statement of Stubbs' position on this question
may be found in the Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commissioners, published in 1883.7 The text of the Report, subscribed to
if not written by Stubbs, states that "the canon law of Rome, though
always regarded as of great authority in England, was not held to be
binding on the courts."8 From the context of the sentence, it is quite
clear that the Commissioners thought that neither the lay nor the
ecclesiastical courts felt bound by "the canon law of Rome." Stubbs'
Historical Appendix to the Commission's Report expands on this
theme. According to this appendix, the sources of law for the English
church courts up to the time of the Reformation were three. First
was "the canon law of Rome," 9 that is, Gratian's Decretum,1° the
Decretals of Gregory IX,11 the Sext of Boniface VIII, 12 the Clementines,13 and the Extravagants.14 According to Stubbs, "a knowledge
5. F. POLLOCK&: F. MA.lTLAND, THE HlsroRY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EowARD I (2d ed. 1898).
6. For a general description of the series and a listing of M:aitland's contributions,
see E. MULLINS, supra note 3, at 276-79.
7. 1 ECCLESIASTICAL CoURI's COMMlSSION, REPORT OF THE Co!ll:MISSIONERS INTO THE
CONSTlTUTION AND WORKING OF THE EcCLESIASrICAL COURTS (Gr. Brit. 1883).
8. Id. at xviii.
9. Stubbs, Historical Appendix, in id. at 21, 25.
10. This is the first book of the Corpus Juris Canonici. It was composed circa 1140
by the monk Gratian of Bologna. The book is a compilation of canonic materials,
canons of general and provincial councils, papal letters, and e.xcerpts from theological
writings, from the entire range of sources known in Gratian's time, arranged systematically, with Gratian's interspersed commentary. See generally A. VAN Hovi:,
PROLEGOMENA IN CoDICEM JURIS CANONIC! §§ 343-51 (2d ed. 1945).
11. This is the second book of the Corpus Juris Canonici and is principally a
collection of papal decretal letters dating between 1140 and 1234. The book was
compiled by the Dominican, Raymond of Pefiafort, and promulgated by the pope,
Gregory IX, in 1234. See generally id. §§ 362-65.
12. This is the third book of the Corpus Juris Canonici and is a collection of
decretal letters and conciliar legislation dating between 1234 and the end of the
thirteenth century, promulgated by Boniface VIlI in 1298. See generally id, §§ 368-70.
13. This is the fourth book of the Corpus Juris Canonici, a collection principally
of canons promulgated by Clement V in the Council of Vienne (1311-1312). The
Clementines were promulgated by Clement's successor, John XXII, in 1317. See
generally id. §§ 371-72.
14. These are the last two books of the Corpus Juris Canonici and comprise the
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of these was the scientific equipment of the ecclesiastical jurist, but
the texts were not authoritative."15 Second was "the civil law of
Rome," which, "from the reign of Stephen [mid-twelfth century] onwards, was refused any recognition except as a scientific authority in
England."16 Third was "the provincial law of the Church of England
contained in the constitutions of the archbishops from Langton downwards and the canons passed in the legatine councils under Otho and
Othobon. The latter, which might possibly be treated as in themselves wanting the sanction of the national church, were ratified in
councils held by Peck.ham."17 In Seventeen Lectures Stubbs develops
the theme of ratification and suggests that the canon law of Rome
was authoritative only if it had been ratified in national or provincial
church councils.1 S
In a series of witty articles, which were published in book form
seventy-five years ago last year, Maitland launched a broadside
against Stubbs' position.19 The first three articles are each devoted
to a different facet of Maitland's argument, but perhaps the best
summary of his position is found in the first article, in which he
answers the Commissioners' statement that the canon law of Rome
was regarded as of great, but not binding, authority: "In all probability, large portions (to say the least) of the 'canon law of Rome'
were regarded by the courts Christian in this country as absolutely
binding statute law. . . . Each of them [the Decretals, Sext, and
Extravagants of John XXII and the Common Extravagants. The Extravagants of John
XXII consists of decretals of that pope. The Common Extravagants consists principally
of fourteenth and fifteenth century decretal letters. Neither collection was officially
promulgated in the Middle Ages. See generally id. §§ 373-75.
Over the years standard citation forms have developed for the books of the
Corpus Juris Canon!ci, and those forms will be used for those books that will be
cited herein. The Decretals = "X" (from the fact that they were originally called
Liber Extra, the book added onto Gratian's Decretum); the Sext = "VI" (from the
fact that it was originally regarded as the sixth book after the five books of the
Decretals); the Clementines = "CLEM." The arabic numbers following the indication
of the collection refer to the book, title, and chapter, respectively. Thus, "CLEM.
5.11,2," cited in note 174 infra, refers to book 5, title 11, chapter 2 of the Clementines.
This can be found in the standard modem edition on which all subsequent citations
of the text and rubrics of these books is based: 2 CoRPus JURIS CAN0N1c1 col. 1200 (A.
Friedberg ed. 1879). The Friedberg edition contains only the text and the rubrics.
For the glosses it is necessary to refer to an early printed edition. Citations herein to
the glosses to the Decretals are to the edition printed by Nicholas de Benedictis,
DECRETALES DOMINI PAPE GREGORII NONI (Lyons 1510). For the casus I have used
DECRET.ALES cuM GLOssIS (Lyons 1584), See notes 189 & 213 infra.
15. Stubbs, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. w. Snmns, SEVENTEEN LEcruREs ON THE STUDY OF MEDIAEVAL AND MODERN
HmoRY 351, 354-57 (3d ed. 1900).
19. F. l\iArrLAND, ROMAN CANON I.Aw IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1898).
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Clementines] was a statute book deriving its force from the pope who
published it, and who, being pope, was competent to ordain binding
statutes for the catholic church and every part thereof, at all events
within those spacious limits that were set even to papal power by
the ius divinum and ius natu:rale."20
Maitland adduces three principal bodies of evidence to support
his view. First,21 there is William Lyndwood's Provinciale, a collection of English ecclesiastical legislation with elaborate glosses that
was completed in 1430. Lyndwood was perhaps the most distinguished
of all English medieval canonists, the Official (chief judge) of the
Court of Canterbury and, later, bishop of St. David's.22 The book
contajns numerous statements of the binding authority of the papal
law collections; indeed, one must assume the binding authority of
the papal law collections to make sense of the book, for what it contains can only be regarded as a set of "bye-laws," as Maitland called
them, with vast gaps, particularly in the important area of marriage,
that must be filled in from papal sources. Second,23 there is the system
by which the pope delegated the authority to hear cases brought
before him to judges in the area in which the case originated. The
judge delegate system is described24 by William of Drogheda, an
Anglo-Irish canonist of the thirteenth century. Drogheda's book assumes that the most important ecclesiastical cases will be heard before judges delegate, and recent research seems to confirm that this
assumption is correct for Drogheda's time.25 The pope not only
authorized judges delegate to hear the cases but also instructed them
as to the law that they were to apply. 26 These instructions, a remarkably large number of which are of English provenance, constitute a
great part of the entries in the papal law collections.27 Third,2 8
20. Maitland, Canon Law in England: I. William Lyndwood, 11 ENGLISH HISTORICAL
REv. 446, 447-48 (1896), reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at l, 2-3.
21. Maitland, supra note 20, at 468, 470-71, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note
19, at 3, 5, 38-39.
22. Lyndwood's dates are 1375-1446. See generally 12 DIGTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY William Lyndwood 340 (1893).
23. Maitland, Canon Law in England: III. William of Drogheda and the Universal
Ordinary, 12 ENGUSH HISTORICAL R.Ev. 625, 632-33 (1897), reprinted in F. MAITLAND,
supra note 19, at 100, Ill-13.
24. WILLIAM OF DROGHEDA, SUMMA AUREA in 2 QUELLEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DCS
RoMIScH-KANoN1scHEN PROCESSES w MITI'ELALTER pt. 2 (L. Wahrmund ed. 1914).
25. See J. SAYERS, PAPAL JUDGES DELEGATE IN THE PROVINCE OF CANTERDURY 11981254 (1971).
26. See Maitland, supra note 23, at 628, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19,
at 104-05.
27. See Maitland, supra note 23, at 639, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19,
at 122.
28. Maitland, Canon Law in England: II. Church, State, and Decretals, 11 ENGLISH
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there are the various medieval English "church-state" controversies,
of which the Becket affair and the papal provision controversy are
perhaps the most familiar. 29 During these ~ontroversies the English
church maintained-stoutly in the case of Becket, and less stoutly
but still maintained in the case of papal provisions-the position of
the canon law of Rome against the royal assertion of native English
law and custom. Lynd-wood's book, the judge delegate system, and
the positions that the church took in opposition to the king are
matters of fact. To the extent that Stubbs ignored them, he gave a
distorted picture of what was actually going on.
It is fair to say that the seventy-five years since the publication of
Roman Canon Law in the Church of England have seen the general
acceptance of the Maitland view. The one serious attempt to restore
Stubbs' view30 is generally regarded as a failure,31 and Stubbs himself,
in later editions of Seventeen Lectures, published what might be
regarded as a retraction of his position.32 Perhaps the best measure
of Maitland's success is the fact that the report of the Anglican Archbishops' Commission on Canon Law, the work of a body that certainly
cannot be accused of extreme papist views, specifically rejects the
Ecclesiastical Court Commissioners' Report and adheres to the views
of Maitland.83
Despite this general acceptance, Maitland's views have recently
been subject to some attempts at revision, and there seems to be
emerging what we might call a "yes-but" school of thought on the
matter: Yes, Maitland was basically right and Stubbs basically
wrong, but . . . .
In the case of Charles Duggan34 the "but" is that Maitland35 and,
even more, Z. N. Brooke36 were ·wrong in thinking that the large
HISTORICAL REv. 641, 647, 650 (1896), reprinted in F. :M:Arrl.AND, supra note 19, at 51,
62, 65.
29. For the Becket controversy, see A. POOLE, FROM DOMESDAY BOOK TO MAGNA
CARTA 1087-1216, at 197-231 (Oxford History of England No. 3, 3d ed. 1970); for the.
papal provision controversy, see w. PANTIN, THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE FOURTEENTH
CENTURY 47-75 (1955).
30. A. OGLE, CANON LAW IN MEDIAEVAL ENGLAND (1912).
31. The views expressed in this book are pretty well demolished in Davis, The
Canon Law in England, 34(47) ZEITSCHRlFI' DER SAVIGNY-STIFI1JNG 344 (Kan. Abt. No. 3,
1913). Cf. Dibdin, Roman Canon Law in England, 217 Q. REv. 413 (1912),
32. See W. STUBBS, supra note 18, at 335-36, 351 n.2, 354 n.3, 356 n.11. Cf. Dibdin,
supra note 31, at 424-27.
33. ARCHBISHOPS' Co:r..unSSION ON CANON LAw, THE CANON LAW OF THE CHURCH OF
ENGLAND 36-37 (Gr. Brit. 1947).
34. C. DUGGAN, TWELFTH CENTURY DECRETAL COLLECTIONS AND THEIR IMPORTANCE
IN ENGLISH HISTORY (U. of London Historical Studies No. 12, 1963).
35. Maitland, supra note 23, at 640, reprinted in F. MArrr.AND, supra note 19, at 123.
36. Z.N, BROOKE, THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY FROZ..t THE CONQUEST TO
THE REIGN OF JOHN 191-214 (1931).
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percentage of decretals addressed to England found in the Decretals
of Gregory IX gives any indication that English bishops were peculiarly prone to asking que~tions of the papacy. The large percentage of
English decretals, as Duggan's study shows, can be accounted for by
the fact that many of the twelfth-century decretal collections on
which the Decretals were ultimately based were of English provenance.87 Now, the fact that English bishops had such collections
made may indicate a peculiar devotion to papal law, but we certainly
have no evidence from which to assume that English bishops received
a disproportionate number of decretals. 38
In the case of J. W. Gray the "but" is more serious. Maitland,
says Gray, may be right as a matter of legal theory, but in practice
the dominance of papal law was subject to two major qualifications:
the English bishops' systematic nonenforcement of some of the papal
law and the bishops' refusal to press specifically papal gravamina
before the king. 39
37. See C. DUGGAN, supra note 34, at 1-12.
38. Brooke argued that prior to Becket the English church had remained aloof
from Rome, at least on a legal plane, and had closely identified itself with the king
and the king's law. See generally Z. N. BROOKE, supra note 36. After the Compromise
of Avranches (1172), Brooke hypothesized, the papal letters that we find in the
Decretals came flooding into England in order to bring the English church up to date
after its long isolation. See generally id. Duggan's work casts doubt on the proposition
that England received more papal letters than other European countries or that there
was any need to bring the English church up to date. His findings, however, do not
disprove Brooke's hypothesis about the situation before Becket; they only take away
some of its support. It may be that the English bishops had collections made of papal
letters, because they had a peculiar need to know what the papal canon law was (al•
though the detailed and sophisticated nature of what they collected does not indicate
that they were looking for basic principles). It seems more likely, however, that the
English decretals are part of a general European phenomenon of the period: the rise
and growth of the papal judicial system and papal law. See Cheney, The Compromise
of Avranches of 1172 and the Spread of the Canon Law in England, 56 ENGLISH HIS•
TORICAL R.Ev. 177 (1941). If Duggan is right, however, about the situation before Becket,
a great deal of work that relied on Brooke's findings may need revision. E.g.,
Thorne, The Assize Utrum and Canon Law in England, 33 CoLUllf. L. R.Ev. 428, 428-36
(1933). Clearly, however, Duggan's work does not upset Maitland's basic conclusion
that after the Becket controversy the English church looked to the pope for definitive
rulings on canon law, and it may support the proposition that it did so even before
Becket.
39. Gray, Canon Law in England: Some Reflections on the Stubbs-Maitland Contro•
versy, in 3 STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY 48 (G. Cuming ed. 1966). Gravamina were the
formal grievances that the English church presented to the king. Records of many
of these gravamina survive, together with, in some cases, the king's reply, and they
constitute important evidence for our knowledge of English medieval "church-state"
relations on a political level. Exclusive reliance on these records is, however, dangerous.
They frequently contain irreconcilable statements of principle, and they do not give
us a clear view of how these conflicts were resolved in practice. A good collection of
thirteenth-century gravamina may be found in F. POWICKE & C. CHENEY, COUNCILS
AND SYNODS WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO nm ENGLISH CHURCH (1964). A sum•
mary of what they say about relations between king's courts and church courts may
be found in Jones, Relations of the Two Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation in
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Finally, Dean E. W. Kemp, in his Litchfield lectures of a few
years ago, suggests that Maitland's view of the Decretals, Sext, and
Clementines as "absolutely binding statute law" must be modified
in light of the fact that a large portion of these books is devoted to
reporting papal decisions in specific cases.40 Thus, the papal law
books may more fittingly be analogized to collections of cases than
to collections of statutes. Since case law is more malleable than
statute law, Maitland must be regarded as having overstated his position. Further, Dean Kemp points out, no discussion of the authoritative nature of the canon law in England is complete if one ignores
the fact that canon law specifically recognizes custom as a source of
law and recognizes that at times custom may override specific law to
the contrary.41
We can go even further than the "yes, but" school. Some of
Stubbs' most questionable statements, if slightly recast, point to
issues that are still unresolved. For example, that the papal collections were not authoritative in the English ecclesiastical courts cannot be maintained,42 but precisely how they were authoritative may
still be regarded as an open question. While it may be somewhat
anachronistic to call the papal collections, as Dean Kemp does,
"[l]eading cases in canon law,"43 it is positively misleading to call
them statute books in the same sense that the Internal Revenue Code
is a statute or even that a modem civil code, such as the French Code
Civil or the Codex Juris Canonici of the Roman Catholic Church, is
a statute book.44 Again, it cannot be maintained that it was necessary
that papal law be ratified by national or provincial councils for it to
be binding on the English Church.45 On the other hand, canonic
·writers of the period generally held that a law had to have been
promulgated before it was binding, and promulgation by a provincial
council was a traditional and accepted method of giving a canon law
binding force. Further, there was a respectable body of, medieval
canonic opinion that held that at least some of the papal methods of
England in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, 7
NAISSANCE HlsTORY

STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL RE-

79 (1970).

40. E. KEMP, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 20-21
(1957). Kemp points out that Stubbs defended his views on this ground after Maitland's
attack. Id. at 14-16.
41. Id. at 26-29.
42. See, in addition to Maitland's work, part III infra.
43. E. KEMP, supra note 40, at 21.
44. See part m infra.
,
45. The evidence is summarized conclusively in Davis, supra note 31, at 351-58.
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promulgation that did not involve national councils were of questionable validity. 46
Thus, there is some doubt whether Maitland said the last word
on the authoritative nature of the Roman canon law in medieval
England. That doubt suggests that the time may have come for a re•
examination of the question. Since Maitland wrote, considerably
more evidence has come to light. In particular, scholars47 have finally
gotten around to examining a source that Maitland himself suggested48 was crucial to the solution of the problem-the records of
the English medieval ecclesiastical courts themselves. These records
are important because it is only through them that we can find out
whether and how the theory that we find in Lyndwood was applied
in practice, and it is only through them that we can confirm or
refute the suggestion Maitland made on the basis of Drogheda49 that
all significant questions of canon law were resolved by papal rescript.
Further, these records can give another dimension to our under•
standing of how the king's and the church's seemingly irreconcilable
statements of jurisdictional principle were resolved in practice.
Although the records of the ecclesiastical courts are not the un•
charted sea that they were in Maitland's· day, few of the many surviving records have been published; 50 many have not been carefully
examined in manuscript; and many, indeed, still need to be sorted and
calendared. A sufficient amount of work has been done with these
records, 51 however, that segments of them can be examined for the
light they shed on the Stubbs-Maitland debate. Any general conclusions, of course, ·will only be valid to the extent that they prove to be
tme of the records that cannot be so examined at this time. But the
46. On medieval canonists on promulgation, see M. LOHMULLER, THE PROMULGA•
TION OF LA.w 25-27, 68-92 (Catholic University of America, Studies in Canon Law No.
241, 1947); 2 C. PLoCHL, GESCHICHTE DES KmCHENRECHTs 62-63 (1955). Lyndwood, however, does not appear to have been among those who had doubts. See
LYNDWOOD,
PROVINCIALE lib. 1, tit. 3, c. [I] (Hujus autem), gloss on publicam notionem (1679). Cf.
Davis, supra note 31, at 357 n.l.
47. E.g., Sheehan, The Formation and Stability of Marriage in Fourteenth Century
England: Evidence of an Ely Register, 33 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 228 (1971); Helmholz,
Canonical Defamation in Medieval England, 15 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr0RY 255 (1971).
48. Maitland, supra note 23, at 644-45, reprinted in F. 1\.fAITLAND, supra note 19, at
130-31.
49. Maitland, supra note 28, at 641-42, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at
51, 51-53.
50. Jones, supra note 39, at 99 n.47, contains a bibliography of most of what has
been published.
51. Most of them are now in the hands of professional archivists and are available
for examination by qualified scholars. Thorough sorting and calendaring has begun.
See, e.g., D. SMITH, A GUIDE TO THE ARCHIVE CoLLECrIONS IN THE 130RTHWICK INsrrrtJTE
OF HisroruCAL RESEARCH (13orthwick Texts &: Calendars No. 1, 1973).

·w.
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time seems ripe for making an initial examination and drawing some
tentative conclusions, subject to revision in the light of new evidence.
The succeeding parts of this essay will be devoted to those tasks.
Before we get to that, however, let us try to define more carefully
the purpose and scope of the inquiry. The question of how binding
the authority of the Roman canon law was in medieval England was
an important one for Stubbs because he wanted to use the results
of his inquiry to support his position in the ecclesiological controversies of his day. If he could demonstrate the independence of the
English church from Rome prior to the Reformation, he could use
that independence to counteract the arguments of the "Romish"
churchmen of his time. If he could demonstrate an identity of
position of the medieval English church and the medieval English
kings, he could use that identity to argue, at least on historical
grounds, against disestablishment of the Anglican Church.52
While the results of our inquiry may still have some relevance
for the ecclesiological debates of our own time, modem scholarship
has seen an importance in the question beyond the polemical purposes to which its answer might be put. The ecclesiastical historian
wants to understand more fully the interrelationship benveen the
papacy, the state, and the local churches in the Middle Ages. This
understanding may, depending on his philosophy of history, be important to him simply for its intrinsic interest, or to help him understand how we have gotten to where we are, or because a knowledge
of the true nature of these relationships in the past, although they
cannot be recreated, may help him or others to shape similar relations
in the future.
For us as legal historians or as lawyers, on the other hand, the
purpose of the inquiry is different. An inquiry into the binding
nature of the canon law in medieval England may help us to explore
two separate groups of questions. First, is it possible for nvo different
legal systems--canon law and common law-to operate simultaneously in the same geographic area, particularly when those nvo legal
systems make overlapping jurisdictional claims? Since the king had
an army in England and the pope did not, wouldn't all such conflicts
be resolved in favor of the king, and if this were the case, in what
sense could papal law be said to be "binding"? How would. a court
behave if it were subject to a theoretically binding law emanating
from the Court of Rome when there was a competing law, backed by
52. Gray, supra note 39, contains an excellent summary of the ecclesiological debates
of Stubbs' time and of the influence that they may have had on his work and on that
of his followers.
"
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secular force, emanating from the Court of Westminster? More generally, how did these three sets of legal institutions-the papal courts,
the royal courts, and the local ecclesiastical courts-relate to each
other?
Second, putting to one side the potential institutional conflicts,
to what extent is any body of law "binding" on a judge called upon
to decide a given case? To what extent and in what way does a judge
use law to decide a case? Specifically, how were the papal law books
used in the English courts Christian?
With these two broad sets of questions in mind, we can further
subdivide the inquiry. In Part II we shall examine, in the light of
the records of the Consistory Court of York from the years 1300-1399,
two sets of institutional relationships-that between the English
church courts and the king's courts and that between the English
church courts and the papal court-and we shall also examine the
sources of the law applied in the English church courts. In Part III
we shall tum to the question of how the papal law was applied by
examining some "briefs" that survive from the Canterbury ecclesiastical courts in the thirteenth century. In Part IV we shall essay some
tentative conclusions.
II. THE

YORK CONSISTORY COURT,

1300-1399

One way of getting a feel for what the records of the ecclesiastical
courts have to offer is to look at the work of one court over an extended period of time. For this purpose, let us look at the Consistory
Court of York in the fourteenth century. Two reasons prompt this
selectio"ii: the importance of the court and the number and richness
of its surviving records. The Archbishop of York not only had jurisdiction over his mvn large diocese but also had appellate jurisdiction
over the suffragan dioceses of Durham and Carlisle. 58 The Consistory
53. For a discussion of the relationship between York and its suffragan dioceses
(including the Scottish diocese of Whithorn), see R. BRENTANO, YORK METROPOLITAN
JURISDICTION AND PAPAL JUDGES DELEGATE 1279-1299, at 83-114 (U. of Cal. Publications
in History No. 58, 1959),
For the reader who is unfamiliar with medieval ecclesiastical jurisdiction, a brief
and simplified introduction may be in order. The smallest unit of jurisdiction was the
parish. Parishes were grouped into deaneries, and deaneries into archdeaconries, the
smallest unit in which one normally finds a regularly sitting court, presided over by
the archdeacon's official. Archdeaconries were grouped in dioceses, headed by a bishop
or an archbishop. Each diocese had at least one consistory court presided over by the
bishop's or archbishop's official. The bishop or archbishop might also have had a
personal court, frequently called the court of audience.
Provinces were groupings of dioceses headed by an archbishop and containing his
diocese and one or more suffragan dioceses, each headed by a bishop, Appeals from the
suffragan dioceses could be heard in the archbishop's consistory court, as at York, or
in a separate court established for the purpose, such as the only other medieval English
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Court of York, which exercised a large part of the Archbishop's
"civil" jurisdiction, heard both first instance cases from within the
York diocese and appeals from inferior courts of both the diocese
and the larger province.54 Since almost all the records of the Court of
Arches, the appellate court of the Archbishop of Canterbury, have
been lost,55 the York court's records are the only records that survive
in any quantity from a medieval English provincial church court.
Further, the records of the York court for the fourteenth century are
not only numerous but extraordinarily rich. There exist some 263
sets of cause papers,56 documents actually used in litigation. Nothing
comparable survives from any other church court of this period.57
There are also some fragments of books of acta, journals of the
court's daily business, from the years 1370-1375.58
Because some cases are divided among tw-o or more sets of cause
papers, the 263 sets of cause papers actually represent some 232 cases,
provincial church court, the Court of Arches in the Canterbury province. See generally 1 W. Hor.nswoRnr, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 598-603 (7th ed. rev. 1956); F.
l\!AKOWER, THE CONS11TUTIONAL HISTORY OF
(1895).

THE

CHURCH OF ENGLAND §§ 33-44, 59-66

54. It seems that any litigant could, if he chose, bring his case before the York
Consistory, if the reus (defendant) resided within the York diocese. Because of the great
distances within the York diocese, however, less important cases were frequently begun
before an official of one of the five archdeaconries: York, East Riding, West Riding,
Richmond, or Nottingham. Appeals lay to the York Consistory from the archdeacons'
courts and also from the various peculiars (special jurisdictions within the diocese, such
as the peculiar of the collegiate church of Beverley or that of the Dean and Chapter of
York Minster (Cathedral)). Appeals, but apparently not first instance cases, could be
brought to York from the consistory courts of the bishops of Durham and Carlisle.
See generally R. BRENTANO, supra note 53.
55. See D. OWEN, THE RECORDS OF THE ESTABLISHED CHURCH IN ENGLAND 50-51
(British Records Assn., Archives &: the User No. 1, 1970).
56. These records have been deposited by the Archbishop in the :Borthwick Institute
of Historical Research, St. Anthony's Hall, York. They are numbered, more or less in
chronological order, "CP.E. l" to "CP.E. 263." Since the research for this paper was
completed, the Borthwick has undertaken to renumber the CP .E. series, moving cases
that do not belong in the fourteenth century to their appropriate place, consolidating
numbers where a given case is divided among two or more sets of papers, and adding
numbers where two or more cases may be found in one set of papers. The citations in
this article are to the CP.E. numbers as they existed prior to the beginning of the
renumbering effort. The new numbers may be traced by looking up the old numbers
in a handlist kept at the Borthwick.
·
I am currently undertaking an edition of a selection of the fourteenth-century cause
papers for the Selden Society.
57. A selection of similar records for the thirteenth-century Canterbury courts is
being edited for the Selden Society by Professor Norma Adams. Curiously, the quantity
of the Canterbury records declines markedly in the early fourteenth century, just when
the York series begins.
58, These fragments are contained in M2(l)b and M2(l)c of the Dean and Chapter
Library, York. M2(l)b contains entries from January to July, 1371. M2(l)c contains
entries from October 1371 to October 1375, but there appear to be a number of gaps
in the sequence.
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bearing dates from 1301 to 1399.59 We have reason to believe that the
court handled roughly 50-100 cases a year, so that the total number of
cases heard over the century was probably in the range of 5-10,000.60
Thus, cause papers survive from two to four per cent of the cases
heard in this period. There is aiso evidence that the process by which
these cases, rather than others, have survived is random. If this is
correct, then the surviving cause papers represent a statistically valid
random sample of cases heard in the York Consistory Court during
the fourteenth century. 61
Table I lists the number of cases in the cause papers by decade
and type. 62 To summarize, marriage cases (including both actions
for restoration of conjugal rights and for divorce) account for about
forty per cent of the total. Cases involving ecclesiastical finances,
including cases concerning the right to the income of a parish
church or other ecclesiastical office (benefice), and litigation about
church taxes (tithes), about a portion of the income of a benefice
(pension), or about miscellaneous moneys owing or usually paid
(other financial), represent about thirty per cent. The remaining
thirty per cent are divided roughly as follows: cases concerning wills
(testamentary), nine per cent; defamation, six per cent; breach of
faith, five per cent; ecclesiastical jurisdiction, four per cent. The
remaining four per cent represents a miscellaneous group of cases,
including five appeal cases, the underlying substance of which is
unclear, four cases involving the finding of a chaplain for a church,
and one each involving assault, trespass to land, breach of a guardian's
59. In addition to consolidating cases divided among two or more sets of papers, I
have also excluded from the count nine cases that bear dates in the fifteenth century,
five cases that can, with reasonable confidence, be assigned to the fifteenth or later
centuries on the basis of paleographical and diplomatic evidence, and ten cases that
seem to belong to the fourteenth century but cannot be assigned to any decade within
that century. See note 62 infra and accompanying te....:t.
CP.E. 1 (1301) is the earliest surviving set of York cause papers that has come to my
attention. Over 300 sets of cause papers exist for the fifteenth century, and the number
for each of the three succeeding centuries runs into the thousands.
60. I.e., defining "case" as a piece of business coming before the court that was sufficiently contended to have produced cause papers. See Appendix A infra.
61. For a discussion of the statistical problem, see Appendix A infra.
62. For the truly ambitious reader who wishes to calculate the proportions after
including the cases that can be assigned to the fourteenth century, although not to any
particular decade within that century, I can report that CP.E. 258 and CP.E. 24Iz arc
tithe cases; that CP.E. 90, CP.E. 240, and CP.E. 241s are "other financial," the first
involving the rebuilding of a parish church, the second a mortuary, and the third, an
inquisition about dilapidations of a chancel; that CP.E. 42 apparently involves the
jurisdiction (perhaps the tithes) of a parish church and a hospital; that CP.E. 166 and
CP.E. 2410 are defamation cases; and that CP.E. 241v is a marriage case and involves
an appeal to Rome. I challenge anyone who enjoys straining his eyes under ultraviolet
light to figure out what CP.E. 167 is about.
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Marriage
Tithe
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1
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1

1
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7
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8
2
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1

1

4
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7
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duties, violation of a sequestration, and procedural matters (the underlying substance being unclear). 63
From the point of view of the relationship of the king to the
English church, a most striking characteristic of the York court's
jurisdiction is the number of cases that the court heard that "ought"
to have been in the king's courts. In fact, there are "jurisdictional
problems" with over forty per cent of the cases that the court was
hearing-with every category other than the marriage, testamentary,
and jurisdiction cases. For example, an examination of the texts of
the various writs of prohibition that might issue from the Chancery04
would lead one to the conclusion that the king's courts claimed jurisdiction of ordinary cases of breach of contract to the exclusion of the
ecclesiastical courts, and there is evidence that the king's judges
thought that this was the law.e 5 Yet we find a number of cases before
the York court in which disputes about ordinary commercial contracts
were heard under the rubric of breach of faith (laesio fidei). For example, Lawrence Litster·c. Lady Katherine, wife of Sir John Ward,
63. At the 90 per cent confidence level we can estimate that the underlying marriage
cases represent 33-44 per cent of the underlying population; ecclesiastical finances, 25-35
per cent; and miscellaneous, 25-35 per cent. See Appendix A infra. The confidence
intervals for the totals of the types of cases of which there are more than 10 examples
listed in Table 1 follow:

Type of Case
Marriage
Tithe
Benefice
Testamentary
Defamation
Breach/Faith
Jurisdiction

Number
of Cases

Per cent
of Total

Intervals
(in per cent)

89
31
29
22
14

38
13
13
9
6
5
4

33-44
9-17
9-17
6-12
3-9
2-8
2-7

11

10

64. For example, Writ No. 121 in a register of writs of the early fourteenth century
reads, in pertinent part:
We prohibit you [the official of the bishop of Durham] from holding in Court
Christian a plea concerning chattels or debts whereof A. complains that B. is
driving him into a plea before you in Court Christian unless those chattels or
debts relate to a testament or a marriage, because pleas concerning chattels and
debts which do not relate to a testament or a marriage pertain to our crown and
dignity.
EARLY REGISTERS OF WRITS 137 (Selden Society No. 87, E. de Hass & G, Hall ed. 1970)
(register can be found in Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Rawlinson C292, ff. 9a-104a).
For York examples, see CP.E. 141; CP.E. 72.
On the writ of prohibition generally, see Adams, The Writ of Prohibition to Court
Christian, 20 MINN. L. REv. 272 (1935); Flahiff, The Writ of Prohibition to Court
Christian in the Thirteenth Century [pt. l], 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261 (1944); Flahiff,
The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century [pt. 2], 7 ME•
DIAEVAL STUDIES 229 (1945); Jones, supra note 39, at 85-87.
65. See statements from yearbooks quoted in 2 w. HOLDSWORTH, HlsrORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 305 (4th ed. 1936).
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Kt., 66 involves a suit by a York dyer for 76~.Sd., which he claims the
lady agreed to pay him for dying a batch of wool.
Not only did the York court hear breach of contract cases, but it
also served as a kind of registry for recording contracts. The acta for
the period from January to July 1371 contain eleven entries of
promises to pay, for a variety of reasons, sums ranging from 3s.2d. to
£40.67 This contract jurisdiction is not peculiar to York. The fourteenth- and fifteenth-century act books of the Canterbury Consistory
Court reveal thousands of breach of contract cases,68 and similar
cases may be found in many surviving church court records of the
period.69
The breach of faith cases are not the only ones that we would be
surprised to find in a church court. From at least the time of the
Becket controversy (third quarter of the twelfth century) the English
king had claimed jurisdiction over disputes involving advowsons.70
Papal law, on the other hand, claimed jurisdiction over such disputes
because of the spiritual nature of the advowson.71 Attempts by the
church courts to hear disputes about advowsons, we learn from those
who have examined the plea rolls, were regularly prohibited.72 The
York court did not claim to hear advowson cases as such, but it
regularly heard cases involving the right to possession of a given
church. Since the possessor normally had some kind of claim of right,
these benefice cases frequently involved an underlying dispute over
the patronage.73
Considerably more work needs to be done with these fourteenthcentury benefice cases before we can be sure precisely what is at stake
in each of them. A few statements, however, can be made at this time:
66. CP.E. 180 (1390).
67. See l\!2(l)b, supra note 58.
68. B. WOODCOCK, MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CANTERBURY
89-92 (1952).
69. See R. Helmholz, Private Actions for Breach of Faith in the Medieval Church
Courts (unpublished paper delivered at Am. Soc. for Legal History Third Annual
Meeting, Chicago, Nov. 9, 1973).
70. An advowson is a species of incorporeal property that gives the patron (the
owner of the advowson) the right to present a clerk (a generic term for an ecclesiastic
who had taken even minor orders) to some vacant benefice (an ecclesiastical office,
like that of parish priest, which carried with it an income). Normally, the patron
would present his candidate to the bishop; the bishop would determine if the candidate were qualified; and, if the candidate were found qualified, the bishop would
institute the candidate to the benefice. For a brief review of the history with further
references, see Jones, supra note 39, at 102-32.
71. See X 3.38,21. See also X 3.38 (entire title).
72. See Jones, supra note 39, and sources cited therein.
73. See, e.g., John de Singleton c. Simon de Hockyngham, CP.E. 39 (1339); Peter
Gabun c. Bishop of Durham, CP.E. 127 (1382).
"
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(1) None of the cases involves a suit by one patron against another.
(2) Papal provisors74 would bring their cases to the ecclesiastical
courts (and ultimately to Rome) when the validity of the papal
provision was at stak.e.75 (3) Even a presentee of the king would bring
his suit to the ecclesiastical courts when the issue was whether the
benefice to which he was presented was in fact vacant76 or when he
was disturbed in the possession of his living by threats of excommunication by the prior of a neighboring religious house. 77 (4) Many of
the cases involve presentation of a vicar and not of a rector. 78 The
right to present a vicar was normally held by a monastery. This fact,
coupled with the relative newness of the institution and the confused
nature of the law surrounding it,79 may have raised some doubt
whether the king's law applied and may account for the presence
of these cases in ecclesiastical courts.
It was fairly well established as a matter of royal law that a
dispute over tithes that involved one quarter or more of the income
of the living (the benefice to which the tithes were attached) was
cognizable in the king's courts, because the decision in such a case
would affect the value of the advowson. 80 This rule appears to have
been ignored by the York Consistory Court, which apparently relied
on the papal law81 that declared all tithes to be cognizable by the
ecclesiastical courts because of their spiritual nature. Many of the
tithe cases, of course, involve sums that must have been less than
one fourth of the value of the living; 82 other cases, however, seem to
involve large sums, sums that must have been greater than one fourth
of the value of the living. 83 The court heard both types of cases and
74. That is, clerks who had obtained a claim to the benefice from the pope by
papal provision, a process that bypassed the presentation process. See generally W.
PANTIN, supra note 29.
75. E.g., Ubertino, Rector of Egglescliffe c. John de Hylawe [?], CP.E. 35 (1338).
76. See, e.g., William de Skipwith c. Robert de Rishton, CP.E. 47 (1341).
77. See, e.g., William Pulkowe c. Prior of Haltemprlce, CP.E. 64 (1352),
78. E.g., John Godens [?] c. Richard de Sysonby, CP.E. 24 (1325); Adam de IUlming•
ton, Vicar of Kernetteby [?] c. William Fynelay, CP.E. 94 (1367). On the appropriation
of benefices by monasteries and the resulting distinction between rectors and vicars of
parish churches, see F. MAKowER, supra note 53, at 329-32; R. HARTRIDGE, A HlsToRY
OF VICARAGES IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1930).
· 79. See id.
80. See Jones, supra note 39, at 161-62, and sources cited therein.
81. See, e.g., X 3.30.25.
82. See, e.g., John de Tewcatcs [?], Rector of Lofthouse c. Robert dcl Wode, CP.E.
141 (1385) (six pence; prohibited (I), see text accompanying notes 80 supra &: 83, 99
infra); Thomas Porter, Rector of Ryther c. John Webster, CP.E. 228 (1394) (eighteen
pence). Lofthouse was valued at eight pounds in 1318. TAXAno EcCLESIASTICA ANGLIAE
ET WALLIAE 324 (Gr. Br. 1802). Ryther was valued at £16 13s.4d. in 1291. Id, at 323.
83. E.g., John Brimham, Rector of Walkington c. John Midilton, CP.E. 222 (1394)
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proceeded in the same way regardless of the amount involved. There
is no evidence in these or in any other cases in the fourteenth-century
papers that the court was concerned about whether it exceeded its
jurisdictional boundaries, as those boundaries were viewed by the
king's law, and there is no record in any of these cases, even in the
ones that were prohibited, of counsel's attempting to argue that the
court was exceeding its royally defined jurisdiction or even of counsel's suggesting that a prohibition might lie.
The contract, benefice, and tithe cases do not exhaust the types
of cases that, from the point of view of the king's law, are surprising
to find in an ecclesiastical court. The trespass to land case (brought
by a clerk against a layman) is certainly an odd one to find in an
ecclesiastical court. 84 Similarly, we might wonder about the assault
case, although it involved assault on a prioress and resulted, therefore,
in the defendants' being subjected to the ecclesiastical sanction of
excommunication.85 We might even wonder about the five pension
cases (all involving churchmen) in the light of the text of the writ
prohibiting one of them.86 In many of these cases it would seem that
the court's claim to jurisdiction rested on the canon law's notion that
cases involving churchmen belonged before the ecclesiastical courts
regardless of the subject matter of the suit.87
Further, even the cases that we might expect to find in ecclesiastical courts frequently involve holdings that would certainly have
seemed odd to the judges of the king's courts. Abbot & Convent of St.
Alban's c. Peter Flemyng& Johanna, daughter of Mariota, 88 is perhaps
the most striking example. Walter Flemyng was a York priest and
apparently a man of some substance.89 He made a will leaving his
(10 pounds). Walkington was valued at 20 pounds in 1291. See TAXATIO EcCLESIASl'ICA
W ALLIAE, supra note 82, at 302.

.ANGLIAE ET

84. Prior&: Convent of Newburgh c. William Trolley, CP.E. 75 (1357). The prohibition de transgressione (concerning trespass) might have lain here, even though the
tresspass is to a church and cemetery, and the pleadings indicate that excommunication
on the ground of desecration seems to have been a possible sanction. On the writ
de transgressione, see Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 279-80. See
also text accompanying note 154 infra.
85. Pr1oress of Handale c. Nicholas de Mersk [?], CP.E. 3 (1306). Chapter 3 of
Articuli Cleri, 10 Edw. 2, stat. 1, c. 3 (1316) would probably permit the church courts to
impose this sanction: " ••• if any lay violent hands on a clerk [including a religious
woman?], the amends for the peace broken shall be before the King, and for excommunication before a prelate • • • ."
86. See note 97 infra and accompanying text. But cf. Jones, supra note 39, at 161-62.
87. On jurisdiction ratione personae (by reason of the person), see P. FOURNIER, LEs
64-82 (1880).
88. CP.E. 169 (1369).
89. Walter may have been the son or brother of Nicholas Flemyng, who was Lord
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Mayor of York in the early fourteenth century. See P. Tn.r.orr, A
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property to his niece, Johanna, his sister's daughter, and to one Peter
Flemyng, who may have been his brother or his nephew-the relationship is not stated. When the will was duly probated, the Abbot
and Convent appeared before the York court and offered a competing
document, a subsequent will of Walter's that had been probated
before the official of the bishop of Avignon. Apparently Walter had
spent his last days at the papal court in Avignon. There he had duly
executed a will with a decidedly continental flavor in that he made
one Robert of Worms his universal heir and devised all his land to
St. Alban's. After failing to show that the second will was formally
defective, Peter and Johanna's proctor filed a brief in which he
patiently explained that, with some exceptions not applicable to the
case, English land could not be devised without leave of the king. He
might have added, although he did not, that conveyances of land to
monasteries were void under the Statute of Mortmain. 00 The court
brushed his arguments aside and rendered judgment for the monastery. One would have thought that Peter and Johanna would then
have brought an action in the king's courts. They seem not to have,
however; instead, they appealed to the pope, and at this point the
case disappears from view. 01
The Flemyng case leaves many tantalizing questions unanswered.
If either Peter or Johanna were Walter's heir at law, why did the heir
not bring an Assize of Mort d'Ancestor or ·writ of entry against the
monastery, which, they alleged, had seized the rents of the land? If
neither of them were Walter's heir, why did they argue that a will of
English land was void? This argument, if it had been accepted, would
have undercut their claim under the prior will just as much as it
would have undercut the monastery's. Nonetheless, the case provides
a fascinating insight into the independence of the church courts from
the rules of the king's law and also indicates that at least some litigants
preferred to pursue their cases within the church system even when
they ought not have been there. Once the litigants got into the church
courts, they discovered there a system prepared to deal with their
cases according to its own rules.
sHIRE: THE CITY oF YoRK 55, 110, 404 (Victoria County Histories 1961). He was almost
certainly a member of the landed York family of that name. See id. at 41.
90. 7 Edw. 1, stat. 2 (1279). In fact, the Flemyings' proctor may have confused the
common law rule prohibiting the devise of much of English land, which did not in•
clude, at least as a regular matter, an e.xception when the king's permission was obtained, with the statutory rule against conveying land to monasteries, which expressly
allowed for royal dispensation. See generally M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 266-81 (Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Studies &: Texts No. 6, 1963).
91. Of course, Peter or Johanna may ultimately have gone to the king's courts. The
choice of the ecclesiastical forum did not preclude, at least in practice, the pursuit
of a remedy in another forum. See note 248 infra.
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The fact that church courts decided cases over which the king's
law claimed jurisdiction and decided issues in cases where it con-.
cededly had jurisdiction in a way that undercut the king's law is of·
some relevance to the Stubbs-Maitland debate. The papal law, at
various times, claimed jurisdiction over most of these matters,92
despite what the secular law said, and the fact that the York court
heard such cases indicates that this claim was more than a theoretical
one. This finding, however, is not a new one. No recent scholarship
suggests that the English church simply acceded to the royal claims
of jurisdiction, and the accepted view93 seems to be that, at least in
the fourteenth century, the king did not attempt to force cases in the
disputed jurisdictional area out of the church courts and into his own
if the parties to the case did not object to having the case proceed in
the church courts. If either of the parties wished the case removed to
the king's courts, however, that party could obtain a writ of prohibition, thereby stopping the church court proceedings and effectively
demonstrating the superiority of the king's law. In this way, as one
recent writer has put it, the king kept a steady, gentle pressure on the
church courts to bring them into line.94
The York records contain evidence both to support and to undercut this view. There are eight cases in the sample that involve writs
of prohibition. There is no evidence that any of the ·writs was disobeyed. Two of the cases95 are in the acta, but not in the cause
papers. The acta entries indicate that_ these cases were prohibited, but
we have no idea of the nature of the underlying suit. Of the cases in
the cause papers involving prohibitions, one is a benefice case in
which two ·writs of prohibition are found in documents submitted
to the court.96 Why the party cho_se to submit these documents
is unclear, since they do not, at least on their face, prohibit the hearing of the case currently before the court. They may be there as a
warning to the court not to proceed ·with a certain aspect of the case,
or they may be there simply to <:X-Plain why the underlying issue in
92. See P. FOURNIER, supra note 8'7, at 64-94, and sources cited therein.
93. See Jones, supra note 39, at 204.
94. Id.
95. Wife of William de Selby c. John de Gisbur, M2(l)(b) [Dean & Chapter Library,
York] f. 7r (1371); Richard del See c. William de Hexham, M2(l)b [Dean & Chapter
Library, York] f. 9v (1371).
96. John de Singleton c. Simon de Hock.yngham [?], CP.E. 39 (1339). The two writs
are in the same form but involve different parties. The form of the writs is not standard: They are directed to the Archdeacon of Richmond and begin "prohibemus" but
seem to conclude with the formula of the indicavit in that they prohibit the archdeacon from hearing the case until the advowson question is determined in the king's
courts. They are difficult to read and may be forgeries or miscopies by a clerk unfamiliar with royal diplomatic. One of the witnesses in this case also mentions that
one of the parties to the original case had obtained a quare impedit.
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the case had not previously been clarified. The remaining five are
identifiable cases that are directly prohibited-two pension,07 one
defamation, 98 one tithe, 99 and one involving a ta."' imposed on a
chantry chapel.100
The fact that the prohibitions all seem to have been obeyed and
the fact that with but one exception101 they all seem to have been
directed toward preventing the hearing of cases that ought not, from
the king's point of view, have been in the York court in the first
place lend support to the steady, gentle pressure view. On the other
hand, the weight of the evidence seems to point in a quite different
direction. There are twenty-nine benefice cases over the century in
only one of which is there even a suggestion of prohibition, five
pension cases and only one prohibited, fourteen defamation cases
and only one prohibited, eleven contract cases and only one prohibited, 102 thirty-one tithe cases (of which an indefinite number
violate the one-fourth-of-the-revenues rule) and, again, only one prohibited. This is not a steady, gentle pressure molding the church
courts to the king's liking but an occasional scoop of water drawn
out of the incoming tide.
However many prohibitions were being issued from Chancery
97. Prior &: Convent of Blyth c. Roger de Kell<, CP.E. 250 (1383) (cum clause of
prohibition worded: "cum placita de annuis redditibus in regno nostro Anglie ~t
coronam et dignitatem nostram specialiter pertineant"). This form does not appear in
EARLY Rl:GisrERS OF 'WRITS, supra note 64, nor in Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra
note 64, but does appear in Rl:GISTRUM OMNIID.1 BREVIUM f. 38r (1595). See tm,t accompanying note 86 supra. This is also the form of writ found in William Chese c. Katherine, widow of Henry Axiholm, CP.E. 217 (1395). This case came to the York court as
a breach of faith case-failure to abide by an agreed upon arbitration. For this reason
I have classified it in Table I supra as a "contract" case. The underlying dispute, however, concerned a pension. See note 248 infra.
The encroachment of the king's courts into the area of ecclesiastical pensions in
the fourteenth century is noted in Cheyette, Kings, Courts, Cures and Sinecures: The
Statute of Provisors and the Common Law, 19 TRADmo 295, 336 &: n.135 (1963).
98. Alice Pepynell c. John Ward, CP.E. '12 (1356) (prohibition de catallis et debitis).
99. John de Tewcates [?] c. Robert del Wood, CP.E. 141 (1385) (two prohibitions de
catallis et debitis with intervening consultation citing Articuli Cieri and permitting
court to proceed so long as case does not deal with tithes of "great trees"). For the re•
ceived learning on the prohibitable nature of cases concerning tithes of "great trees"
(trees of twenty years' growth or more), see ·w. EASI'ERBY, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF
TITHES IN ENGLAND 50 (1888). On the prohibition de catallis et debitis, see Flahiff, 6
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 277-79; on the consultation, sec Flahilf, 7
MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 229, supra note 64, at 239-41.
100. Robert Lord c. Executors of Bishop of Lincoln, CP.E. 172 (1365) (form of prohibition indeterminable).
101. Robert Lord c. E."<ecutors of Bishop of Lincoln, CP.E. 172 (1365). See note
100 supra. I can think of no compelling reason why this case should not be in an
ecclesiastical court. It seeins to involve a challenge to the bishop's authority to im•
pose a ta."< on the chapeL Perhaps the theory of the prohibition is that the tax affects
the value of the income of the chantry chaplain and hence the value of the advowson,
102. William Chese c. Katherine, widow of Henry A.'tiholm, CP.E. 21'1 (1395). Sec
note 97 supra.
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during this period (and a tentative examination of the public records
for this period would indicate that the number was quite substantial),103 the small number of prohibitions received at York in proportion to the number of cases being heard in violation of the king's
jurisdictional rules could hardly have given the court the impression
that it was being subjected to much pressure to remove such cases
from its docket. Rather, the relatively small number of prohibitions
received, combined with some of the details of the system's operation, must have made the system seem like an occasional, arbitrary,
and not always effective interference with the court's exercise of its
jurisdiction.104 For example, the jurisdiction of the church courts in
defamation cases was a matter of some controversy.
the thirteenth
century questions had been raised as to whether the church courts
should be hearing such cases at alI:105 By the fourteenth century, the
king's law conceded that the church courts could entertain defamation cases, at least in some circumstances. The composition between
Edward I and the bishops knmvn as Articuli Cleri specifically recognizes ecclesiastical jurisdiction in defamation cases so long as the
church court confines itself to ecclesiastical sanctions.106
The reference to ecclesiastical sanctions in Articuli Cleri is
probably intended to prevent the church courts from assessing
money damages in defamation cases, although an earlier royal statement of church court jurisdiction, known as Circumspecte Agatis,
allows the church courts to commute corporeal penances for money
payments.107 Further, there is a form of the prohibition ·writ (de
difjamatione) that expressly forbids the church courts from entertaining defamation actions brought as a result of accusations made
or evidence given in the royal courts.108 Thus, we might summarize
broadly the king's courts' rule as follows: The church courts will be

In

103. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 39, at 102-32.
104. One might argue that the prohibition system was psychologically effective, even
if it operated sporadically, because it interfered with the York court's pattern of
orderly law enforcement. This might be called the "Chinese water torture" or the
"waiting-for-the-other-shoe-to-fall" theory of prohibitions. The theory depends, however, on the premise that the York court viewed its role as one of law enforcement, and
the evidence points in quite another direction. See text accompanying notes 265-73
infra.
105. See Flahiff, 6 :MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 290-91, 307 (describing
thirteenth-century attempts to limit the jurisdiction of the church courts, so far as
the laity were concerned, to marriage and testamentary matters).
106. 10 Edw. 2, stat. 1, c. 4 (1316).
107. The te."t of Circumspecte Agatis may be found in Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL Snmms
261, supra note 64, at 312-13. The document may be dated in 1286. For an account of
the events leading up to it, see id. at 302-09; for the problem of money damages, see id.
at 291. See also Graves, Circumspecte Agatis, 43 ENGLISH H:IsroroCAL REv. 1 (1928).
108. See Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL Snmms 261, supra note 64, at 281-82; Jones, supra
note 39, at 201-02.
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prohibited if they entertain defamation cases that might impede
royal justice or if they attempt to assess damages for the defamation.
But if this were the theory on which the king's courts were proceeding, the one prohibition of a defamation case109 in the cause
papers would have given the York court no inkling of it. In the York
papers the prohibition writ appears to be simply mistaken, since it
says nothing about defamation, the king's courts, or money damages
but, rather, prohibits the court from dealing with the case because
it involves lay chattels or debts (which it does not).11° Further, the
writ was ineffective because it was received by the York court after
tht defendant in the case had been excommunicated. The court simply suspended proceedings and left the defendant to find a remedy
from the king, if he could.
There is one bit of evidence that would indicate that royal pressure had some effect on the cases that the York court heard, but the
source of that pressure was not the prohibition system. As Table 1
indicates, more than twice as many cases survive from the decade
1390-1399 as from any other decade; yet there are no benefice cases
during this decade, although benefice cases make up thirteen per cent
of the total. Now the chances of this happening just by the luck of
the draw are about I in 1000.111 It is far more likely that the reason
we see no benefice cases in our sample of this decade is that the number of such cases fell off drastically at this time. One possible explanation for this decline would be the passage of the so-called "Great
Statute of Praemunire."112 It has become widely accepted that this
statute was directed, not so much against the ecclesiastical courts in
England, as against the papal court in Rome.118 Its repercussions,
however, may have been felt at York.114
109. Alice Pepynell c. John Ward, CP.E. 72 (1356).
110. See Flahiff, 6 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 261, supra note 64, at 281 n.104, for an early
(1230) instance in which this writ is used to prohibit a defamation case. It is possible
that this writ was used in the Pepynell case because the prohibition de diflamatione
only dealt with•actions arising out of defamations alleged to have been made in royal
courts (id. at 281) and not with the problem of money damages. There is, however, no
indication that the Pepynell case involved money damages.
111. Our expectation would be that at least 13 per cent (the lower limit of the
confidence interval at the .90 level) of these cases would be benefice cases. In fact there
are none, yielding a chi2 statistic of 10.3. Since .5 per cent of the distribution of a chi2
with one degree of freedom lies beyond 7.9, and the .I per cent distribution beyond
10.8, we may reject the hypothesis that the 1390-1399 cases show the same proportion
of benefice cases as do the preceding years. See Appendix A infra.
ll2. 16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1393).
113. The exact purpose and thrust of the statute are controverted, It seems to p).ln•
ish those who obtain papal bulls or sentences that interfere with judgments rendered
by the king's courts in advowson cases. See Waugh, The Great Statute of Praemunire,
37 ENGLISH HlsroRICAL REv. 173 (1922).
114. When we consider the fact that fully two thirds of the benefice cases heard
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The king's victory, if such it was, was short-lived. Benefice cases
appear again in York in the fifteenth century,115 although a casual
examination of the records indicates that they never again became
quite the staple of the court's jurisdiction that they were in the
first half of the fourteenth century. Nor does the praemunire statute
seem to have had any effect on cases, other than benefice cases, that
the York court should not, from the point of view of the king's law,
have been hearing. The very decade that saw the disappearance of
benefice cases also witnessed the largest number of contract cases,
both absolutely and in proportion to other types of cases.116
So far, the evidence of the York cases seems to support Maitland's
view of the role of the Roman canon law in medieval England. We
see a church court that exercised a broader jurisdiction than the
king's law-at least the statements of it that we find in the text of the
prohibition writs, in various statutory instruments like Articuli
Cleri, and in judicial statements like those in the yearbooks concerning contract cases-would seem to have allowed.117 This jurisdiction rested, in large measure, on the Roman canon law's view of
the appropriate role of the ecclesiastical courts.118 Indeed, Maitland
might have been a bit surprised at how far the York court was able
to go in the face of the more restrictive view that the king's law took
of the role that it ,vas supposed to play. Let us now look more closely
at the second relationship we proposed to examine, that between the
York court and the Court of Rome.119
The acta illustrate papal and royal interference operating in approximately the same way on the court. In Prior & Convent of Ecclesfield c. William Fulmer, Vicar of Ecclesfield,120 the Prior sues Fulmer
about a tithe matter, and William is contumacious. The Prior introduces evidence ex parte, and the court is prepared to render jup.gin the York court were bound for the papal court anyway, the effect of Praemunire
becomes more understandable. See text accompanying notes 136-37 infra.
115. See, e.g., Leonard de Hedon c. William de Ganton, CP.E. 11, 12 (1404); Prior&:
Convent of Watton c. Bishop of Carlisle, CP.E. 26 (1406); Prior &: Convent of Holme
Cultram. c. Lady Margaret de Wighton, CP.E. 53 (1410).
116. See Table I supra.
117. On possible royal motivation in this matter, see note 251 infra and accompanying text.
118. See text accompanying notes 71, 81, 87 &: 92 supra.
119. "Court of Rome," Curia Romana, is a shorthand found in the documents to
refer to a number of papal institutions to which appeal might be had or cases brought
at first instance. The "Court of Rome," during most of the fourteenth century, in fact
sat in Avignon, where the popes resided during the "Babylonian Captivity" of the
papacy and where the pope to whom the English adhered resided during most of the
"Great Schism." See generally G. BARRACLOUGH, THE MEDmvAL PAPACY 140-85 (1968).
120, M2(l)b [Dean &: Chapter Library, York], ff. Ir, Iv, 2v, 3r (two entries), 3v, 5r
(two entries), 6v, 7r, 7v (1371).
j
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ment, when a priest named John of Lanercost appears and offers some
papal letters that purport to excuse Fulmer's failure to appear. The
judge states, and the acta are unusually full at this point, that he is
"prepared humbly to obey apostolic mandates in all things."121 The
next day, when Lanercost explains that he does not have authority to
continue to represent Fulmer in the latter's absence, the judge says
that he is prepared to do Fulmer the "complement of justice" should
Fulmer or his proctor wish to continue the case and that he will not
proceed without Fulmer because of the papal letters. 122 By contrast,
the final entry in Richard del See c. William de Hexham 123 states
laconically: "A royal prohibition was published and therefore-."124
The effect was the same; in both cases the proceedings ceased. But it
is hard not to see in the difference between the unusually full e.xpla•
nation of the court's deference in Ecclesfield and the terse entry in
del See a reflection of quite different attitudes to the two superior
authorities.
Forty-one of the sets of cause papers contain at least a stated inten•
tion by one of the parties to appeal to the Court of Rome, and another
three involve proceedings held after a matter had been delegated back
to York by the pope. From the point of view of the binding quality
of papal law these £acts are important. Even if the York court was not
applying papal law, litigants clearly could appeal to the Court of
Rome where that law would be applied. Further, the mention of
papal delegation calls to mind the £act that cases may be begun before
the pope as a matter of first instance and that these may be heard
before delegates in the way that Maitland describes in the Drogheda
article. 126
On the other hand, contrary to what we would e.xpect from
reading Maitland, the York court was not simply a lower level court
that passed all cases of any importance to the Court of Rome, or which
all important litigants bypassed in order to begin their cases before
the pope as a matter of first instance. We cannot, of course, tell how
many cases began in Rome at a matter of first instance, but the York
court was quite capable of calling litigants before it and providing
them with a forum £or resolving their differences. However many
cases began in Rome or were appealed to it, a number of significant
cases began and, so far as we can tell, ended in the York court, 126 and
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

M2(l)b, f. 7r.
M2(1)b, f. 7v.
M2(l)b [Dean & Chapter Library, York], ff. Sv (two entries), 9r, 9v (1371).
M2(l)b, f. 9v.
See Maitland, supra note 23.
See, e.g., Prior & Convent of St. Mary's, Carlisle c. Bishop of Carlisle, CP.E. 22
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a number of others began elsewhere within the province and, again
so far as we can tell, ended in the York court.127
Further, while there are mentions of papal judges delegate in the
York records, the small number of such mentions128 lends support to
the suggestion that others have made that this institution was on
the decline in the fourteenth century.129 Part of this decline may be
attributed to the fact that more cases were being heard by the Rota
during this period.130 Part of the explanation may, however, lie in
the fact that, at least at York, there was a relatively efficient disputesresolution mechanism that could decide cases to the satisfaction of
the parties without the trouble and expense of a trip to the continent.131
Not only did the York court play a significant role in disputes
resolution institutionally independent of the Court of Rome, but it
also played a significant role in cases that were being appealed to that
court. Thirty-one of the forty-one appeals to Rome mentioned in the
York records are tuitorial appeals, cases in which the appellant is
seeking the protection (tuition) of the York court pending the appeal
to Rome. Tuitorial appeal seems to have been an institution peculiar
to the two English archdioceses. The references to it in the papal law
books182 are problematic, and there is no full-scale treatment of it
to be found in any of the standard medieval treatises.133 The granting
(1331) (prior and convent claim advowson of church by papal indult; bishop, claiming
a papal provision, gave the church to another and refused to accept the prior and convent's man; prior and convent appeal to York); Abbot &: Convent of Furness c. Official
of Archdeacon of Richmond, CP.E. 31 (1335) (dispute concerning power of archdeacon
to correct monks; monks, claiming papal privilege, appeal to York).
127. See, e.g., William de Skipwith c. Robert de Rishton, CP.E. 47 (1341) (presentee
of king sues in York court to obtain his benefice from prior incumbent, whom, he
alleges, has been excommunicated); Katherine, daughter of Sir Ralph Paynell, Kt. c.
Richard, son of Sir Walter Cantelupe, Kt., CP.E. 259 (1368) (divorce for impotence,
involving two noble families).
128. There are six sets of cause papers dealing with papal delegation: CP.E. 262
(1331[?]): CP.E. 48 (1342); CP.E. 53 (1345); CP.E. 54 (1345); CP.E. 57 (1357 {?]); CP.E. 172
(1365); CP.E. 243 (1379). Of these, three sets deal with requests for tuition upon appeal
from judges delegate (48, 53-54, 57), and three with proceedings taken by the York
court in cases delegated by the pope to the archbishop (262, 172), or the official (243).
129. See, e.g., Pantin, The Fourteenth Century, in THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE
PAPACY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 159, 177-78 (C. Lawrence ed. 1965).
130. 7 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE Rote Romaine 742 (1960). The Tribunal of
the Holy Roman Rota ·was the principal court of the pope by the end of this period.
131. Just how difficult the trip to Rome was is vividly described in C. CHENEY,
FROM BECKET TO LANGTON 54-56 (1956).
132. See X 2.28.17.
133. The most extensive study of tuitorial appeal to date is P. Wood, Tuitorial
Appeal to the Archbishops of Canterbury and York in the Thirteenth Century (1970)
(unpublished M. Litt. thesis in Edinburgh University Library). See also 1 I. CHURCHILL,
CANTERBURY AD:MINISTRATION 427-30, 460-65 (1933); B. WOODCOCK, supra note 68, at 64-67.
P. Wood, supra, reports on a brief passage in Hostiensis' Commentaria concerning
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of tuition, like the modem grant of a stay pending appeal, seems to
have called for an exercise of some discretion. The extent of that discretion and precisely how the judge exercised it are questions that
need further examination. Some of the cases seem to turn simply
on whether the appellant had followed the proper canonic procedure in taking his appeal; other cases, however, seem to involve
an examination into the merits of the appellant's case.184 Tuition
definitely seems to have been worth fighting for, since almost all the
tuitorial appeal cases contain elaborate and expensive records, many
,vi.th extensive depositions.135 It is at least possible, then, that tuitorial
appeal was a device by which the York court was filtering appeals to
Rome.
Twenty of the thirty-one tuitorial appeals found among the
York papers are in benefice cases, a far greater proportion than the
proportion of benefice cases to the total number of cases in the
sample,186 and these twenty cases represent more than two thirds of
all the benefice cases found in the sample. These statistics seem to
indicate that, however important the pope's jurisdiction as universal
ordinary137 may have been in the fourteenth century, his power as
the fountain of all benefices was clearly of first significance. Why,
however, would the appellant in a benefice case be so anxious to obtain tuition? Clearly, appellants must have thought that they might
incur something akin to irreparable injury if the situation were disturbed pending appeal.
Some help in solving this problem may be found in the somewhat analogous records of significavits. When a litigant remained excommunicate for forty days, the bishop could ask the Chancery to
order the sheriff to seize the excommunicate and put him in jail
until he made his peace with the Church. Numerous records of such
significavits, as the process of requesting the order to seize was called,
tuitorial appeal in England. (Hostiensis' Commentaria is, unfortunately, unavailable
to me.) Wood cites no other medieval academic commentary on the topic. Cf. Didier,
Henri de Suse en Angleterre (1236?-1244), in 2 STUDI IN ONORE DI VINCENZO AMNGIO•
RUIZ 333 (1953).
134. Compare, e.g., Prior & Convent of Bridlington c. Bishop of Lincoln, CP.E. 4
(1308) (tuition request accompanied by documents of title) and Thomas Hackness c.
Abbot of Whitby, CP.E. 164 (1399) (tuition request opposed on grounds that abbot's
disciplinary action against monk of Whitby was justified) with Bishop of Christopolis
c. William de Emelden [?], CP.E, 57 (1357 [?]) (documents in support simply outline
procedural steps taken to perfect appeal).
135. See, e.g., cases cited in note 134 supra.
136. 29/232. See Table 1 supra.
137. For a definition, see Maitland, supra note 23, at 625-35, reprinted in F. MAIT•
LAND, supra note 19, at 100-16.
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"
have survived.138 During the fourteenth century it became possible
for the excommunicate who had appealed his excommunication to
have the significavit quashed pending his appeal, a process that had
an effect on the litigation like that of the granting of tuition_:._it protected the litigant for a time in order to allow him to perfect his
appeal, if he could.189 Although some of the litigants who had the
significavits against them quashed probably succeeded on appeal, we
would expect that for many quashing would provide only a temporary respite. Many would lose their appeals; many more would
probably never carry their appeals through. The interesting thing
about the records of quashed significavits is that the quashing of the
writ seems to have provided not a temporary, but a permanent respite:
with but a few exceptions quashed significavits were not renewed.140
It stretches credulity to suggest that all these appellants either
won on appeal or immediately capitulated when they lost their
appeals or failed to perfect them. A supplementary reason must be
found for the virtual absence of renewals of the writ. Medieval litigation was every bit as protracted as it is today and, because of the
greater difficulties of travel and communication, even more timeconsuming.141 The advantage lay on the side of the litigant who
could stall the process, because his opponent might well run out of
energy or money, or both. Further, the litigant who could restore
the status quo ante was in a far better position to bargain for· a
compromise than one who was faced with an adverse judgment.
These considerations apply ·with even more force to tuition in
benefice cases than they do to quashed significavits. The litigant who
applied for tuition in a benefice case was almost always the party
who possessed the benefice.142 If he obtained tuition, time was on his
side. Even if he failed to perfect his appeal, the other party had to
reinstate the action. Further, the party with possession of the benefice
had the income from the benefice to pay his litigation expenses and
was in a strong position to bargain for a compromise.148 These would
seem to be the reasons why tuition was sought, and, if they are the
138. For a study and documentation of these records, see F. LoGAN, ExcoMMUNICATION AND THE SECULAR .ARM IN MEnmvAL ENGLAND (Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, Studies &: Texts No. 15, 1968).
139. Id. at 116-36.
140. Of 300 quashed significavits in the medieval period, Logan reports but five in
which attempts were made to have the writ renewed. Id. at 132-33 &: n.75.
141. See C. CHENEY, supra note 131.
142. See, e.g., Peter Gabun c. Bishop of Durham, CP.E. 127 (1382); Nicholas de Hull
c. Robert de Dightom [?], Vicar of Northallerton, CP.E. 74 (1357).
143. See P. Wood, supra note 133, at 90-111.
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correct reasons, the grant or denial of tuitorial appeal by the York
court may, as a practical matter, have been as important a step in the
litigation process as the appeal to the Roman court on which the
grant of tuition was based.
The appeal route from the York court to the Court of Rome
was not, of course, the only contact between the York court and
Roman canon law. There was, as well, the law itself as it was embodied in the papal law books and a multitude of commentaries. To
what extent was this law being applied by the York court?
Because most of the cases heard by the York court were either
abandoned or compromised and because those that did reach the sentence stage were decided without citation of authority, the law being
applied by the court must be determined by inference from the
pleadings and from the facts developed in the depositions. Nonetheless, there can be little doubt that, where papal law was directly
relevant to the substantive issue of the case at hand, the York court
regarded that law as binding and applied it to the case. For example,
a careful examination of the twenty-one sets of marriage cause papers
dating from the first half of the century reveals but two decisions the
substance of which are not fully supported by Book IV of the Decretals, the relevant papal law book.144 Of the two exceptions, one involves a decision by an archdeacon's official who seems to have been a
bit confused about the canonic age of consent.146 But, as Maitland
warns us,146 in inferior courts you must expect inferior law, and the
case was appealed to the York court. The second exception147 involves
not a contradiction (at least on its face) of papal law, but an addition
to it, the custom of abjuration sub pena nubendi.148
Apart from the marriage cases, we still find very few cases in
which the court seems to be applying a substantive law contrary to
papal law, but many cases tum on matters that the papal law either
does not cover or covers in the most general of terms. For example,
144. See Donahue, The Policy of Alexander Ill's Consent Theory of Marriage, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIF.ra INTERNATIONAL CONGRFSS OF l\fEDIEVAL CANON LAW (S. Kuttner
ed. forthcoming).
145. Alice de Draycott c. William Crane, CP.E. 23 (1332).
146. Maitland, supra note 20, at 473, reprinted in F. MArrr..AND, supra note 19, at 43.
147. Matilda de Bugthorp c. Walter Cole, CP.E. 6 (1311).
148. When a man and woman capable of marrying each other were found guilty
of fornication, they were frequently required to exchange words of consent of matri•
mony in this form: "I take thee as husband (wife) if I have further carnal knowledge
of thee." Under the prevailing marriage law such an exchange of consent automatically
became a valid marriage if the condition were fulfilled. See generally Helmholz, Ab·
juration Sub Pena Nubendi in the Church Courts in Medieval England, ll2 THE JURIST
80 (1972).
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there is practically nothing in the papal law books149 on the topic of
defamation; yet defamation cases make up roughly six per cent of our
total. The court was basing its authority to hear these cases on a
provincial constitution,150 as can be seen from the fact that the plaintiffs in such cases invariably ask that the court pronounce upon the
defendant the sentence of major excommunication that was decreed
by the Holy Synod of York against defamers.151 To the extent that
the substantive law applied in these cases cannot be found in the
constitution it seems to have been developed on a case-by-case basis
by the court.152
Other cases turn, not on local legislation, but on local custom.
For example, in the trespass case the plaintiff153 specifically invokes
the praiseworthy (a term of art apparently necessary for validity)
custom of the York archdiocese that cemeteries belong to the church
to which they are attached.154 Other cases involve both local legislation and custom in combination. For example, the pleadings in the
tuitorial appeal cases sometimes invoke the praiseworthy statutes
and customs of the Court of York regarding such appeals.155 Some
cases involve customs so well engrained that they are not specifically
invoked. The cases of abjuration sub pena nubendi may fall into this
category, although there are provincial constitutions on the topic.156
By and large, the validity of these local customs and ordinances
is accepted without challenge. One specific challenge to an alleged
custom is based, not on the fact that it is contrary to a specific papal
law, but on the most general of policy grounds.157 The case is one in
which the inhabitants of a village allege that the rector of a nearby
church has customarily provided a chaplain to serve a chapel in the
149. That is, the Decretals, Sext, and Clementines. Cf. X 5.26.1; X 5.36.9 (both only
tangentially related to problem).
150. The provincial constitution is Synodal Statutes of the Diocese of York [c. 42]
(date uncertain, but before 1276). See 1 F. Pow1cKE &: C. CHENEY, supra note 39, at 496.
151. "Petit [actor reum] in sentenciam maioris excommunicationis sacrosancta synodo
Ebor' contra diffamatores et crimen impositores proinde latam et promulgatam • • ."
is the standard form. See, e.g., Alice Pepynell c. John Ward, CP.E. 72 (1356).
152. See Helmholz, supra note 47. See also W. LYNDWOOD, supra note 46, lib. 5, tit.
17, c.[l] (Auctoritate Dei Patris), and accompanying glosses. There is, however, no evidence that this development occurred through the conscious adherence to the precedents established in prior judgments. See text accompanying notes 177-81 infra.
153. I translate actor and reus as "plaintiff" and "defendant," respectively throughout. The connotations of the English don't quite fit the Latin, but any alternative
seemed precious.
154. Prior &: Convent of Newburgh c. William Trolley, CP.E. 75 (1357).
155. Set;, e.g., William Pulkowe c. Prior of Haltemprice, CP.E. 64 (1352).
156. Helmholz, supra note 148, at 81 &: n.3.
157. Inhabitants of Subholme c. William Rowdon, CP.E. 151, 183, 260 (1389).
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village. The custom alleged, the rector counters, is not "praiseworthy" but "damnable." The inhabitants of the area do not need a
chaplain, and if the rector were compelled to provide one, a diversion of funds that could be better put to other uses would result.
Closely related to the concept of custom is the concept of the possession of rights.158 Many cases turn on this latter concept, frequently
allied ·with an invocation of immemorial custom (prescription of
rights).159 For example, the two most frequently litigated issues in
the tithe cases are whether tithes are owing from somewhat specialized
activities-such as coal mining160 or salmon fishing161 or dairy farming162-and to whom the tithe from a tithable item was owed. The
first issue is by and large conceded by papal law to be a matter of
local custom.163 The second usually is a local matter, at least in the
York cases, because of the nature of the issue: It usually involves the
location of parish boundaries.164 The pleadings and depositions in
tithe cases illustrate the interplay of the concepts of custom, and
possession and prescription of rights in tithe litigation. The plaintiff
alleges that the defendant has withheld or despoiled him of tithes,
the right or quasi-right to which the plaintiff and his predecessors have
peaceably possessed.165 The depositions, frequently with many witnesses, seek to elicit testimony on both sides of this proposition with,
where it is relevant, further testimony on the location of parish
boundaries.166 Similarly, in the jurisdiction cases, the litigated issue
sometimes is not whether the official who has attempted to exercise
his jurisdiction against the plaintiff has that jurisdiction as a matter
of the common law of the Church or papal exemption, but whether
the plaintiff has established a prescriptive right against the official
to be free from the official's jurisdiction.167
158. This is the idea that one's exercise of a right will be protected in somewhat
the same fashion that one's possession of a thing will be protected-without proof of
title. For a discussion of this concept, see C. BRUNS, DAS RECHT DES l3ESITZES §§ 24-26
(1848); E. FINZI, IL POSSESSO DEI D1rurn (1915).
159. For a discussion of this concept, see BRUNS, supra note 158, and sources cited
therein.
160. E.g., Ralph Elys c. John Bolhall, CP.E. 162 (1397).
161. E.g., Prior & Convent of Durham c. John Lokyk, CP.E. 96 (1367).
162. E.g., William Mowbray, Rector of Normanby c. Thomas de Crathornc, CP,E.
177 (1390).
163. 4 DICTIONAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE Dime 1231, 1233 (1949).
164. E.g., Ralph, Vicar of Leeds c. John Aylsy, CP.E. 55 (1345); Hugh de Saxton c.
Roger de Darrington, CP.E. 67 (1354).
165. E.g., Prior & Convent of Pontefract c. Richard de Walton, CP.E. 9, IO, 18 (1317),
166. The cases cited in note 164 supra contain particularly good examples.
167. E.g., Rector & Parishioners of Hemingsborough c. Prior of Durham, CP.E. 6B
(1354).
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The pleadings in a pension case'168 illustrate well the blending of
the concepts of possession of quasi-rights and immemorial custom.
The Prior and Convent of Blyth allege that Roger, the Rector of
Elton, owes them an annual pension of 26s.8d.,
by reasonable custom, properly prescriptive, peacefully and uninterruptedly observed for the entire time aforesaid [sic-"below
said" is probably meant], founded on just cause and of sufficient
antiquity, and [paid] by the rectors of the said church of Elton
who succeeded each other from 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years, and
within, beyond and through these periods and from time and
through time the contrary of which memory of these [things] does
not exist..•. [Further,] the said religious [the Prior and Convent]
were in full, sufficient, canonic and peaceable possession of the [right]
or quasi-right of receiving and having the aforesaid annual pension
in the name of their aforesaid monastery, and actually received it and
had it, and were accustomed to receive it and have it from each
rector of the said church who was successively in that church, the
Archbishops and Dean and Chapter of York •.. knowing, wanting
to know and not contradicting but tolerating and approving both
tacitly and expressly for each and every period aforesaid up to the
time of the above written nonpayment and spoliation ....169
It should be emphasized that all of this is not contrary to papal
law. Papal law specifically recognizes the validity of local legislation
when that legislation is not contrary to the common law· of the
church; 170 it recognizes the validity of custom supplementary to and
in some instances contrary to the common law;171 and it authorizes
possessors not only of things but also of rights or quasi-rights to
bring possessory actions to recover those rights without having to
prove title.172 The fact remains, however, that the existence of these
168. Prior&: Convent of Blyth c. Roger Kelk, CP.E. 250 (1384).
169. The portion of the articles translated above reads:
ex consuetudine racionabili legitime prescripta ac per om.nia et singula tempora
supradi<;ta pacifice et inconcusse observata et ex causa justa et sufficientis antiquitus
legitime constituta, ac a rectoribus dicte ecclesie de Elton [soluta] qui successive
fuerunt a x.xx.xxx.xl.1.lx. annis, ac citra et ultra et per ipsa tempora necnon a
tempore et per tempus cuius contrarium memoria harum non existet • . . . [D]icti
religiosi fuerunt in plena sufficienti canonica et pacifica possessione [juris] vel quasi
juris percipiendi et habendi nomine monasterii sui predicti dictam annuam pen•
sionem et eam actualiter perceperunt et habuerunt et percipere et habere
consueverunt a singulis rectoribus ipsius ecclesie qui successive fuerunt in ipsa
ecclesia, archiepiscopis, decano et capitulo Ebor' . • . scientibus, scire volentibus,
et non contra dicentibus, set tolerantibus et approbantibus tam tacite quam expresse
per omnia et singula tempora supradicta usque ad tempora subtractionis et
spoliacionis suprascripte ••••
Prior &: Convent of Blyth c. Roger Kelk, CP.E. 250 (1384). This case was prohibited.
See note 97 supra.
170. See W. LYNDWO0D, supra note 46, lib. 5, tit. 14, c.[l] (Presbyteri), gloss on

furamento.
171. See R. WEHRLE, DE LA C0UTU!IIE DANS LE DROIT CANONIQUE 100-252 (1928).
172. See C. BRUNS, supra note 158.
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general principles in the papal law books makes the remaining contents of those books irrelevant to the substantive decision in close
to half the cases in our sample.178
In summary, if we frame the question of the authority of the
canon law in the English church courts in the terms in which Stubbs
and Maitland chose to frame it, then Maitland was right; the papal
law was binding. If, however, we regard "law," not as a series of general propositions to which judges give assent, but rather as the set of
rules by which they resolve actual cases, then Stubbs and Maitland
were asking the ·wrong question. The question is not "Was papal law
binding?" It is, in a great many cases, "Was it law?"
When we turn from substantive law to adjective law, the situation becomes even more confused. There is a great deal in the papal
law books about procedure, and the system of procedure described
in them is highly sophisticated, complex, and subject to numerous
detailed rules. There is evidence, however, that the procedure had
become too complicated to be useful, particularly in simple cases, by
the end of the thirteenth century, and Clement V, in a bull of wideranging implications, gave general authorization for the courts to
simplify the procedure in those cases that called for more "summary"
treatment. 174
The procedure followed by the York court is clearly recognizable
as canonic procedure. On the other hand, there is much in it that
cannot be explained solely by reference to the papal law books. 11u To
what extent these deviations can be explained by legitimate local
custom and the changes authorized by Clement V and to what extent they must be regarded as violations, conscious or unconscious,
of papal law are questions that require further research

III. How WAS THE PAPAL LAw UsED?
The picture that we have drawn of the York court so far is one of
an institution-and, if the York example proves valid for the whole,
173. That is, most of the cases other than the marriage cases. See Table I supra.
174. See 7 D1cnoNNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE Procedure 282, 295 (1959). The! bull
is Saepe Contingit, CLEM. 5.11.2. Cf. CLEM. 2.1.2.
175. For example, the papal law seemed to hold that, with some exceptions, the
testimony of women and serfs was inadmissible. See P. FOURNIER, supra note 87, at 185;
TANCREDUS, ORDO JUDICIARIUS, in PILU, TANCREDI, GRATIAE LIBRI DE JUDICIORUllf ORDINE
96,232 (F. Bergmann ed. 1842). Yet we find a number of cases in which women testify,
seemingly without objection, including one (Thomas de Newton c. Richard de Monte,
CP.E. 16 (1327) (deposition of Agnes de Sanndby)) in which a woman testifies in a tcsta•
mentary case in direct violation of the church's common law (see TANCREDUS, supra, at
223), and a number of cases in which people who are at least accused of being serfs
testify (see, e.g., John Button c. Alice Reyny, CP.E. 92 (1365)). It is not always easy to
tell how the court reacted to these accusations, but in the latter case it seems to have
gone ahead, in the face of strong evidence that the witnesses were serfs, and rendered
judgment on the basis of their testimony.
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of a set of instit1,1tions-quite independent of both pope and king.
There were, of course, institutional limits. The writs of prohibition
that we find in the York cause papers seem to have been obeyed, and
there was never any question that any party to a case had the right
to appeal to the Court of Rome. The over-all impression remains,
however, of an institution both stronger and more independent than
a reading of Stubbs or Maitland would lead us to expect.
Stubbs' arguments lead us to expect to find that the medieval
English church courts were strong institutions because the Roman
canon law was not binding on them. The source of the strength, so
we might infer, would lie in the fact that these courts were not closely
identified with the pope but were dependent on the king. Maitland's
arguments, on the other hand, would lead us to expect that the
church courts were weak because the canon law was binding. They
would be in conflict with the king because of their identification with
the pope, and the king, so we might infer, would ultimately triumph because of his greater power. The evidence of the York court
seems to suggest that the institution was strong, quite independent,
and attractive to litigants, and that the canon law was binding. One
reason for this seeming paradox may be that the binding quality of
the canon law did not result in a close institutional identification between the local church courts and the papal court nor between the
law that the church courts applied and papal law. Another possible
reason, as we will suggest in the conclusion, may be that the function of the institution was not to enforce the law but to resolve disputes. But before we get to that we have to examine more closely just
how the papal law bound the court.
We have also discovered that the sources of law for the York
court were far more diverse than Maitland would lead us to suspect.
Local legislation and local custom play considerably larger roles in
actual litigation than Maitland, relying on Lyndwood, suggests176
that they did. On the other hand, there is little to suggest, as Stubbs
would have us believe, that the York court felt that it could choose
to ignore papal law in those situations to which it applied. The question remains: Was papal law "absolutely binding statute law," as
Maitland calls it, or .were the papal law books collections of cases,
as Stubbs and Kemp prefer to call them?177
Neither Maitland nor Stubbs and Kemp fully develop the implications of this distinction for the central question, the binding nature
of papal law. Maitland's reference to "absolutely binding statute law"
176. Maitland, supra note 20, at 473-74, reprinted in F.
41-43.
177. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.

MAITLAND,

supra note 19, at
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implies a view of the legal process by which a judge, faced with a
binding statute, automatically applies the dictates of that statute to
the case before him. The judge in this situation is not a law-maker,
either in the Anglo-American sense that his judgments create precedents on which future judges rely or in the more narrow sense that
he manipulates the inherently ambiguous dictates of the law to
fashion a rule that does justice to the parties before him. When
Stubbs and Kemp suggest that the papal law collections were casebooks, they seem to imply that cases are less binding than statutes,
that the judge has more flexibility in applying case law than he does
in applying statute law, and perhaps that each judgment of an
English ecclesiastical judge, unless overruled by a higher court, is to
form a precedent for use in future judgments.
One of the implications of these arguments can be treated summarily. There is no evidence from this period that the judgments of
the English ecclesiastical courts were regarded as precedent. To the
author's knowledge, there are no collections of such judgments in a
form that would in any way suggest that they were regarded as precedent nor any record of their having been cited as authority, either in
actual cases or in academic commentary. If Stubbs and Kemp mean to
imply that English ecclesiastical court judges made law by their
judgments in the way that an Anglo-American common law judge
makes law, that implication is not supported by the evidence.
There remains, however, the question of the appropriate characterization of the papal law books and the further question of what
that characterization means for the way in which the law was applied.
Let us look first to the papal law books themselves to see whether
they are more appropriately categorized as statutes or as collections of
cases, next to the academic law to see how contemporaries thought
they should be used, and finally to some evidence of how they actually were used.
The Gregorian Decretals contain a number of canons of Councils, particularly the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils,178 and
the Clementines consists almost entirely of canons of the Council
of Vienne.179 These are statutes pretty much in the modem sense of
the term. On the other hand, the vast bulk of the Decretals and
hence the vast bulk of the papal law books180 consists of decisions by·
the pope in actual cases heard before him, opinions in actual cases re178. For a listing of the decretals drawn from canons of the Third and Fourth
Lateran Councils, see 2 CoRl'US Jurus CANONICI, supra note 14, at xii.
179. See note 14 supra.
180. The Sext and Clementines are quite small in comparison,
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£erred to him, or answers to hypothetical cases posed to him by
bishops, roughly equivalent to the decreta, subscriptiones and
epistulae of the Roman law.181 Frequently the compilers have edited
these documents, usually, however, not beyond the point of recognition. It is clear from the fact that they were collected that these decretal letters were regarded as highly authoritative, and their collection,
arrangement, and promulgation in official, and, in the case of the
Decretals and the Sext, exclusive1 82 texts made them even more authoritative, in fact if not in law. But both cases and statutes can be
authoritative, and the fact that the papal law collections were authoritative does not make them any more or less like statutes or like
cases.
In fact, the distinction between statute books and case books is
somewhat anachronistic when applied to the medieval papal law
books. Since neither statute books nor case books existed in the
thirteenth or fourteenth centuries, the distinction between the two
was unknown to Gregory IX, Boniface VIII, John XXII, or their
compilers.183 What the papal law books are is authoritative collections of canons, partaking something of the nature of Justinian's
Digest and more of the nature of his Code and Novels. 184 If we define a statute or code as an authoritative, orderly statement of legal
rules that is at once as concise and as general as possible, we will certainly not regard the papal law books as books of statutes. What
order they have is imposed by the compilers and is not inherent in the
texts themselves. Many of the texts lack both generality and conciseness because of the presence of much material about the controversy
out of which they arose. If, on the other hand, we define a case book as
a collection of reasoned opinions deciding results of specific controversies and striving both to do justice in the individual case and to
set a precedent for the decision of similar cases, then the papal law
books are not case books either.185 They rarely contain reasoned
181. On the Roman law, see H. JoLOWICZ &: B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
THE STUDY OF RoMAN LAW 368-70 (3d ed. 1972).
182. See the bulls of promulgation cited in note 186 infra.
183. Indeed, it might be argued that some notion of separation of powers, or at
least of functions, is necessary for the distinction to be operative. At least, it is hardly
conducive to the development of the distinction to have the functions of supreme court
and law-giver combined in one man, as they were in the case of the pope.
184. The analogy was perceived by the canon lawyers of the time, although the
tendency was to analogize Gratian's Decretum to the Digest and the Decretals to the
Code. See Kuttner, Quelques Observations sur l'Autorite des Collections Canoniques
dans le Droit Classique de l'Eglise in AcrES DU CONGRES DE DROIT CANONIQUE, CINQUANTENAIRE DE LA FACULTE DE DROIT CANONIQUE, PARIS, 22-26 AVRIL 1947, at 305, 308 (1949).
185. The reader who has read at all in the theory of the sources of law will recognize at once the folly of attempting brief general definitions of "case" or "statute." In
TO
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opinions; they frequently do not contain enough facts about the
case to allow us to determine the precise holding (this is, of course,
particularly true of the genuinely statutory material and the answers
to hypothetical questions); and they rarely show much adherence to
the doctrine of precedent.
If the nature of the papal law collections leaves us in doubt as
to whether their contents are to be regarded as more like modern
cases or more like modem statutes, the books themselves give us
even less help as to how they are to be used. The bulls of promulgation,186 for example, say nothing of how the books are to be used,
only that they are to be used by the law schools and the courts.
There is, however, a considerable body of learning outside the
papal law books on the use of the decretals. It states, for example,
that only the dispositive part of a decretal has legal force, not the
statement of facts or the arguments or even the rationale. Further,
the rubrics have legal force, if they do not contradict the black
letter.187 This learning unfortunately doesn't help us much. In the
first place, much of it is the product of the· postmedieval period.
Second, it is itself somewhat ambiguous: At times the insistence that
the dispositive part of the decretal has the sole vis legalis seems to
imply that the decretals are in fact a code with a great deal of unnecessary verbiage added, while at other times, it seems to approach
jurisdictions where there exists a separation of judicial and legislative functions a
rough approximation of definitions can be achieved by saying that cases arc what arc
decided by the judiciary and statutes are what emanates from the legislature. The
roughness of the approximation is apparent: Are private bills or impeachment resolu•
tions "statutes"? Are general procedural rules promulgated by a court "cases"? The
definitional problem is even more severe in jurisdictions where the judicial and lcgisla•
tive functions are not separated or are imperfectly separated. See note 183 supra. Yet
the notion persists that the distinction between "case law" and "statute law" is a useful
one, as the use of the terms in the Stubbs-Maitland literature illustrates. But cf. Dib•
din, supra note 31, at 420-23, for a suggestion of the limited usefulness of the distinction
in this context. My attempt at definition in the text reflects the influence of J. GRAY,
THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF !.Aw 152-259 (1963).
Partially as a result of my attempt to grapple with the case-statute distinction in
the conte.xt of. the medieval English canon law, I have come to the conclusion that
efforts to clarify the distinction frequently divert attention from two more fundamental
issues: How are authoritative legal texts actually used by decision makers, and what is
the nature of the judicial function? See text between notes 242-43 infra and te.xt accom•
panying notes 265-73 infra.

186. Rex Pacificus, X, in 2 CORPUS JURIS CANONIC!, supra note 14, at 1-4: Sacro•
sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae, VI, in id. at 933-36; Quoniam nulla, CLEM. in id. at 1129-32,
187. See A. VAN HovE, supra note 10, at 360-61, 365-66; G. LE BRAs, C. LEFEBRE &:
J. R.AMBAUD, L'.A.GE CLASSIQUE 1140-1378, at 240-43, 250-51, 253 (Histoire du Droit ct
des Institutions de l'Englise en Occident No. 7, 1965); sources cited in both. But cf.
Kuttner, supra note 184; Ielicic, De Mente Gregorii IX in Adornanda Collectionc
Decretalium, in 3 AcrA CONGRESSUS IuRIDICI INTERNATIONALIS VII SAECULO A DECRETALI•
BUS GREGORI! IX ET XIV A C0DICE IUSTINEANO PROMULGA1lS, R.OIIIAE, 12-17 NOVEMDJUS
1934, at 3 (1936).
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the common law notion that only the holding of a case is binding.
Third, there are indications that these notions were not strictly followed throughout the Middle Ages. For example, despite the fact
that even the bulls of promulgation seem to preclude the use of decretal material outside the Decretals and the Sext,188 the authors of the
ordinary gloss189 may be found using such material. '
Thus, neither the nature of the papal law collections nor the
statements as to how they were to be used give us much help in
determining how they should have been applied in the English
church courts themselves, much less how they actually were applied.
A more fruitful way of determining how they were applied is to
look to the way in which they were used in the courts. Unfortunately,
the evidence here is most thin. English canon law judges in the
Middle Ages, like their secular counterparts for most of the period,190
did not generally give reasoned opinions. Fu:ther, and even more
unfortunately, we are lacking any regular record of legal argument,
like that found in the yearbooks, for the ecclesiastical courts. Time
and again the acta will tell us that there was an extended dispute
about a matter,191 but rarely do we leam the nature of the dispute.
A few documents that have survived from the thirteenth-century
ecclesiastical courts at Canterbury do contain arguments of counsel.
Of course, the way a fawyer uses authority in a brief is not necessarily the way a judge uses it in arriving at a judgment. On the other
hand, we may assume that a lawyer intends to convince a judge by
his arguments. If he uses authorities that are not authoritative or
uses proper authorities in a way that is impermissible, he might as
well not bother to ·write the brief; the judge will just not be convinced. These Canterbury "briefs," then, may give us some idea of
what authorities were being used in the English courts Christian and,
hence, the extent to which the papal law collections were the exclu188. E.g.: "Volentes igitur, ut hac tantum compilatione universi utantur in iudiciis
et in scholis, distrlctius prohibemus, ne quis praesumat aliam facere absque auctoritate
sedis apostolicae speciali." Rex Pacificus, supra note 186, at 4.
189. E.g., X 2.19.6, gloss on partibus, suggests that the compilers distorted the meaning of the decretal by what they left out. For explanation of the "ordinary gloss," see
note 213 infra. For edition used, see note 14 supra.
190. See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 50-54 (1968).
191. Habita disputado diutina is the standard phrase. See Donahue &: Gordus, A
Case from Archbishop Stratford's Audience Act Book and Some Comments on the Book
and Its Value, 2 BULL. MEDIEVAL CANON L. 45, 56 (1972). These entries, coupled with
the fact that the academic canon law indicates that the advocate is to make a legal
argument at the close of the case (see, e.g., TANCREDUS, supra note 175, at 263-67), indicate that legal arguments were made before the ecclesiastical courts. Like the yearbook
arguments, they seem, as a rule, to have been made orally, but, unlike the yearbook arguments, they were not recorded and so have been lost to us.
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sive authority in the areas to which they applied. They may also give
us some idea of the extent to which and the ways in which the papal
law collections could be manipulated and, hence, how they were
binding on the English courts Christian.
Two of the surviving Canterbury "briefs" are of particular interest. The first is contained in a set of documents from Robert de
Picheford c. Thomas de Nevill 192 and can be dated between April
1269 and the autumn of 1270. Thomas de Nevill, in 1267, complained to the legate Ottobono that he had· been presented to the
church of Houghton in Leicestershire and instituted and inducted to
the same. Master Robert de Picheford claimed presentation to the
same church by a different patron and also institution and induction.
Ottobono delegated the case to the Prior of Bradley, who rendered
judgment in favor of Thomas. Robert appealed to the legate, who
delegated the case to the priors of St. James and St. John near
Northampton and then left the country. While this appeal was pending, so Robert claimed, the Prior of Bradley put his sentence into
execution. At this point Robert appealed to Rome and to the Court
of Canterbury for tuition. The documents that we have include
Robert's raciones103 Qiterally, "reasons") and supplementary raciones194 attacking the action of the Prior of Bradley before the Official
of the Court of Canterbury.
While the details of Robert's arguments are not always easy to
follow, their basic outline appears to be as follows: (1) The proceedings before the Prior of Bradley were void because Robert was not
properly cited and had no notice of them; (2) the Prior had no power
to put his sentence into execution because his authority did not include the power to institute to a benefice; 196 and (3) in any event,
the Prior should not have acted while an appeal was pending, and
therefore Robert should be restored to possession. Robert was ultimately successful, although we cannot tell which argument or combination of arguments the court found dispositive.
In Robert's raciones there are three citations to the Dec.return,
fourteen citations to the Decretals (two of which are repeated), five
192. Documents from this case are scattered in various classifications of the Cathe•
dral Archives and Library, Canterbury: Ecclesiastical Suit Rolls Nos. 4i-iii, 7-8, 9i-iii,
18, 226, 331, 340; Sede Vacante Scrapbooks Nos. I at 132, II at 50, 64, III at 314; Chartac
Antiquae B398a, Zl52, Zl83. The case is one of the cases that will be printed in Professor Norma Adams' forthcoming Selden Society volume of select Canterbury cases
from the thirteenth century. I am most grateful to Professor Adams for allowing me
to make use of her typescript of the case in preparing this article.
193. Ecclesiastical Suit Roll No. 4iii.
194. Ecclesiastical Suit Roll No. 131.
195. See note 70 supra.
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citations to the legatine constitutions196 (two of which are repeated),
and ten citations to Roman law (three of which are repeated). The
Roman law citations include three to the Digest, three to the Code,
three to the Novels, and one to the Institutes.
The second "brief" comes from a marriage case, John of Elham
c. Alice, daughter of Richard Cissor [Tailor?], 197 and may be dated
some time late in 1293 or in early 1294. It is a less formal document
than the arguments in Picheford c. Nevill and is headed simply "for
the information of the lord judge in sentencing." It contains arguments both of fact and law relevant to Alice's basic defense: that
she had not freely consented to marry John. Although Alice seems
ultimately to have lost the_ case, we cannot tell whether it was the
legal arguments that failed to persuade the judge or whether he
simply did not believe that Alice had made out her case as a factual
matter. The arguments contai!)- eight citations to the Decretals, one
to the Digest, and one to the Summa of Geoffrey of Trani.198
So few actual medieval canonic arguments with citations of authority survive199 that one cannot be sure how typical this list of
authorities is of actual court arguments of the period. Clearly, however, there is nothing in the lists of authorities in these briefs that
should surprise the reader of medieval academic canon law writing.
All of the authorities mentioned are in the romano-canonic tradition, but the papal law books are clearly not the only permissible
authority. Particularly notable is the number of citations to Roman
law in Robert's procedural arguments, citations not only to basic
principles contained in the Digest and Institutes but also to detailed
statutory regulations in the Code and Novels. 200 There are also a
number of citations to commentary rather than to authoritative
texts. Sometimes these citations are apparent from the text of the
citation itself, such as Alice's citation to Geoffrey of Trani's Summa;
sometimes we must look to the cited source in order to discover that
196. That is, the canons promulgated by the provincial councils held under the authority of the papal legates Otto and Ottobono. See F. POWICKE, THE THIRTEENTH
CENTURY 451 (Oxford History of England No. 4, 2d ed. 1962).
197. Sede Vacante Scrap Book No. III at 61 (no. 128), 62 (nos. 130-32). Number 131
is the "brief." It is transcribed in Appendix B infra. I am indebted to R.H. Helmholz
for calling my attention to this document.
198. GEOFFREDUS TRANENSIS, SUMMA IN TITULOS DECRETALIUM (1563).
199. Silvestre, Dix Plaidoiries Indedites du XIIe Siecle, 10 TRADmo 373 (1954), contains ten Belgian canonic arguments from the twelfth century with authorities cited.
The editor, however, believes that these documents were not actually used in litigation
but were school exercises-roughly equivalent to moot court briefs of our own day.
200. E.g., CODE 2.1.7; NoVELS 119.3. A summary of the thirteenth-century controversy over Roman law as an authority in the canonic courts and as a topic of study in
the universities may be found in A. VAN HOVE, supra note 10, at 456-67, 523-28.

686

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 72:647

the citation is not to the authoritative text but to the accompanying
marginal commentary.201 The impression left by the breadth of the
citations is not that there was a single authoritative text to which
all arguments must be directed but rather that there was a large
group of texts and commentary from which each counsel picked his
authorities to suit his argument. In each of these respects the use of
the authorities is similar to that made in such academic writing as
the glosses to the Decretals or any of the numerous treatises of the
period.202
In order to get some idea how and to what extent the authorities,
particularly the papal law collections, were being manipulated and,
hence, how they were binding, let us exami1,1e one of the arguments
in the marriage case. The examination must necessarily be somewhat
lengthy, since it is only as the argument unfolds that we can get some
idea of the different kinds of arguments being made, the assump•
tions under which they are made, and, ultimately, and most importantly, how far from the letter of the papal texts, or even the accompanying commentary, we are being led.
Alice's counsel203 has alleged that four of his witnesses testified to
the proposition that Alice was forced into the marriage contract. He
now has to deal ·with the argument made by John's counsel that this
testimony should not have been admitted because Alice had submitted her articles, written offers of proof, after the testimony of
John's witnesses had been published. This argument addresses an
issue that troubled the canonic courts and commentators throughout
the thirteenth century and beyond. 204 Under canonic procedure a
party who wished to prove a point submitted to the judge written
articles outlining what he wished to prove. The witnesses were then
examined by the judge or other court official separately and in private, and their testimony was reduced to writing. When all the testimony was in, it was published in open court, and copies of it were
given to each party.205 Because of the fear that the opposing party
would suborn perjurious testimony to the contrary, canon law,
201. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 214-16 infra.
202. E.g., GOFFREDUS TRANENSIS, supra note 198.
203. Whether the author of this document was a proctor or an advocate we do not
know. Woodcock reports that the distinction between the two does not seem to have
been observed in the Canterbury Consistory Court. B. ·wooncocK, supra note 68, at 42,
We can avoid the problem by calling him "Alice's counsel."
204. See, e.g., material cited in notes 210, 214, 217-22 infra. See also CLEM. 2,8,2 and
accompanying glosses for a treatment of the problem some two decades after the
Elham case.
205. A basic description of this procedure may be found in P. FOURNIER, supra note
87, at 189-92.
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following Roman law, developed the notion that once the testimony
about a given matter had been published no more evidence could be
introduced on that matter. 206
The principle was well established, but the difficulty came in
devising a verbal formula that defined how far the bar on the introduction of more evidence extended. Did it encompass other proceedings in which the same issue was raised? Did it encompass what today
we would call affirmative defenses? The issue was particularly troublesome in marriage cases, because the more that procedural rules interfered with getting to the truth of the matter, the more likely it was
that undesirable conflicts would rise between the external forum,
the forum of the courts, and the internal forum, the forum of conscience.207 Here is how Alice's counsel argues that the bar should not
extend to the offer of proof of force after the publication of testimony
concerning the marriage contract: 208
So far as the argument of the plaintiff is concerned-that this defense
and its proof should not be allowed to stand because it is an article
contrary to the first and witnesses to such an article cannot be introduced after the publication of the testimony about the first-what
he says about such articles is true but not relevant. There are four
types of articles that should be considered ·with regard to the present
matter: the same article or one completely contrary, one that completely and directly destroys the first, and about neither of these can
there be a produ.ction of witnesses after the testimony about the first
article has been published. X 2.20.38; X 2.19.6; and similar authorities. There are also articles completely diverse from the first but
not contrary to it, and there is a fourth type of article that depends
on the first, supposes the first and adds something to it, but does
not completely destroy it. X 2.20.33; X 2.22.10; and similar authorities. Witnesses about these two types of articles are properly ad206. That the basic motivation for the rule in canon law was fear of subordination
of perjury is clear. See authority cited in note 220 infra and accompanying text. The
Roman law rule, however, may have been prompted more by a desire to expedite the
proceedings. See CODE 7.62.4; NOVELS 90.4.
207. On the two fora, see 5 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONI~UE For 871, 872-73 (1953).
Because of the potential conflict between the two fora, there was even some doubt in
this period as to whether a judgment in a marriage case could ever become res judicata.
See X 2.2.7.7 and accompanying rubric and glosses; L. MUSSELL!, IL CoNCETIO DI GIUDICATO NELLE FoNTI STORICHE DEL DIRITTO CANONICO §§ 7, 15, 19 (Pubblicazioni della
Universita di Pavia, Studi Nelle Scienze Giuridiche e Sociali No. 7 (n.s.), 1972). Granted
this doubt, one could see why some commentators would have thought that the general
rule barring the introduction of new articles after the testimony had been published
did not apply to marriage cases. See text accompanying note 214 infra.
208. Translation by the author. The text of the original is found in Appendix B
infra. The translation is from the item beginning "Quarta excepcio," beginning at
"quod autem dicitur" to "licet presens sit in corpore." The citation system has been
modernized in the translation, and I have chosen some renderings that convey the
brief-like style of the passage at the expense of literal accuracy.
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mitted after the testimony has been published about the first articles,
as the gloss on novis of X 2.20.17 notes. This is the case which we
have at hand. Alice's defense of violence supposes that the form of
the contract was present but that the substance, consent, was absent
(for consent has no place where force intervenes (X 4.1.14)). There'fore, there is no reason why absence of consent or mind, like absence
of body, cannot be proven after the testimony has been published.
For just as it is possible to contract marriage by present consent
even though you are not present in body, as -J.or example by messenger or letter, so it is possible for there to be no contract between
present parties if consent is absent. Just as a madman is said to be
absent in mind even though he is present in body (Digest 50.17.40),
so one who is coerced is said to be absent in that mind that is required for matrimony, even though he is present in body.

If we tum to the texts of the Decretals (the Sext and Clementines
having not yet appeared), we ·will not find anything that directly
answers the question that Alice's counsel was posing: Is a defense
(exception) of force barred after publication of testimony concerning
the contract? Nor do we find any text that makes the fourfold distinction that he suggests is dispositive. Rather, we find a number of
cases that state the general rule, either by way of dictum or holding,
that, once testimony about a matter has been published, further testimony about that matter is barred, and we find a few cases that expressly or by implication go the other way. 200 if we examine the
rubrics of Raymond of Peiiafort, the compiler of the Decretals, we
get the impression that the general rule is well-nigh inviolable. The
only exception that he notes with approval is that where testimony
has been received in a summary proceeding the same articles may be
tried again in a full proceeding using the same or different witnesses. 210
What Alice's counsel has done, then, is to create a coherent pat•
tern where no coherent pattern is directly suggested in the texts. To
do this he employs cases that Raymond placed in the Decretals to illustrate quite different rules. He is helped to his result by the glosses,
although none of them makes his point quite so precisely as he
does: 211
209. See text accompanying notes 211-28 infra.
210. X 2.20.38.
211. We need not, of course, assume that the pattern is original with Alice's
counsel. It has all the hallmarks of academic commentary of the period, and it may
have been something that he learned in the University. I know of no contemporary
commentary, however, that approaches this particular problem in quite the way that
he does. Durandus suggests a fourfold division in his treatment of the same problem.
G. DuRANDUS, SPECULUM CUllt ADDITIONIBUS lib. 1, pt. 4, tit. de attestationum publi·
catione, § 7 (1508). The division, however, is not the same as that employed by Alice's
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(I) "There are four types of articles that should be considered
with regard to the present matter." None of the texts or glosses says
this, and to reach this statement, Alice's counsel has had to ignore, as
not pertinent to "the present matter," the one distinction that the
rubrics mak.e,212 that between articles introduced in the same proceeding and articles introduced in a different type of proceeding.
(2) "[A]bout neither of these can there be a production of witnesses after the testimony about the first article has been published.
X 2.20.38; X 2.19.6 ..." Here Alice's counsel partially concedes his
opponent's argument, but in a way that suggests that he need not go
even this far. X 2.20.38 deals with the introduction of the same article, but it is the decretal that holds that such an article may be
introduced in a plenary proceeding even though the same article has
been introduced in a prior summary proceeding. The citation seems
to imply the argument that even where the same article is introduced,
the rule is not so absolute as the plaintiff maintains. X 2.19.6 deals
with an article directly to the contrary and also with a marriage case.
The headnotes213 state that the general rule applies even in marriage
cases, but the glosses note that there is another decretal (X 2.20.35)
that seems to go the other way.214 Some commentators suggest, the
gloss continues, that the distinction to be drawn between these two
decretals lies in the fact that X 2.19.6 deals with a contract of marriage, while X 2.20.35 deals with a present marriage.215 The gloss
ultimately rejects this distinction and suggests that only "different
articles or those pendent on the prior article"216 should be admitted;
but once again Alice's counsel seems to be suggesting that he may
counsel, although there is some similarity in the language and in the decretals cited.
Cf. HoSTIENsIS, Su~u,rA AUREA lib. 2 (de testibus), c. 11 (Venice 1581).
··
212. X 2.20.38, rubric.
213. The marginal commentary on the Decretals is generally divided into two parts:
the casus, a brief statement of the facts and holdings of a decretal much like a modern
headnote, and the glosses, a set of elaborate footnotes keyed to specific words in the text.
The final rescension of these latter, made by Bernardus Parmensis (died 1266), had
already become the "ordinary gloss" (glossa ordinaria). Bernardus also wrote a set of
casus that are found in some but by no means all manuscripts of the Decretals. We can
be reasonably sure that Alice's counsel had the glossa ordinaria before him; we can be
considerably less sure that he had Bernardus', or anyone else's, casus before him. See
notes 14, 189 supra; 2 J. VON SCHULTE, GESCHICHTE DER QUELLEN, UND LITERATUR DES
KANONISCHEN RECHTS VON GRATIAN BIS AUF DIE GEGENWART 115-16 (1875).
214. X 2.19.6, gloss on partibus.
215. See note 207 supra. A contract of marriage, of course, created a merely contractual obligation, while a present marriage was a sacrament, indissoluble even by
the parties and subject to the Biblical injunction, "What God has joined, let not man
put asunder.'' Matthew 19:6. See generally G. JoYCE, CHRISTIAN MARRIAGE (2d ed. 1948).
216. "super alio articulo et super novo pendente C.".: priori.'' X 2.19.6, gloss on
partibus.
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have conceded too much, because one decretal and some commentators suggest that the general rule does not apply to cases of present
marriage at all.
(3) "There are also articles completely diverse from the first but
not contrary to it, and there is a fourth type of article that depends on
the first ... but does not completely destroy it. X 2.20.33; X 2.22.10
...." Here the symmetry breaks down. The statement of law is clearly
derived from the gloss on X 2.19.6, but neither X 2.20.33 nor X 2.22.10
is precisely on point. X 2.20.33 is a case in which the pope, on appeal,
disqualified some witnesses but nonetheless remanded the case for
the taking of new testimony on the same article. The citation is interesting, however, because of the amount of effort Alice's counsel
had to put in to see how it was relevant to his case at all. Neither the
rubric, nor the headnotes, nor the glosses suggest that the case is
contrary to the general rule. The focus of all three is on what the
decretal has to say about the qualifications of witnesses. Alice's counsel, however, saw that the holding of the decretal necessarily involved
an exception to the general rule, an exception perhaps broad enough
to support the proposition that the rule will not be applied where it
works manifest injustice. X 2.22.10 is closer to supporting the point
for which it is cited. In X 2.22.10 the plaintiff, after the defendant's
testimony had been published, introduced evidence to the effect that
a contract, which the plaintiff had proved, was conditional, and the
pope sustained the claim. Raymond put the case in the Decretals
because it supports the proposition that three witnesses prevail over
a ·written instrument.217 The headnotes suggest that the case stands
for the proposition that a new article may be introduced after the
testimony has been published,218 but the arguments of counsel reported in the case suggest that a completely new article could not
have been introduced because the case was on appeal. Rather, the
article that suggested that the contract was conditional "depended
on the old [article]."219 Thus, the case supports Alice's counsel's
proposition that dependent but not contrary articles may be intro"
duced after publication.
(4) "Witnesses about these two types of articles are properly admitted after the testimony has been published ... gloss on novis of
X 2.20.17 ...." X 2.20.17 is the only decretal cited by Alice's counsel that is not a decision in a specific case. Rather, it is the pope's
response to a hypothetical question posed by a bishop: Can new wit217. X 2.22.10, rubric.
218, Id., casus: "super novo articulo puplicatis attestationibus testes recipiuntur."
219. Id., text: "etsi novum esset capitulum, pendebat tamen ex veteri."
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nesses be introduced after the parties have renounced further production of witnesses? The pope's answer states the general rule but
adds that in appeal cases witnesses either old or new may be introduced about a new article. The gloss, citing X 2.22.10,220 defines new
as dependent upon or arising from the old. This is most helpful for
Alice's counsel because it suggests that both new and dependent articles are included within the exception stated in the text of X 2.20.17.
But what of the fact that both X 2.22.10 and X 2.20.17 seem to deal
only with articles introduced on appeal? Here again the gloss comes
to the rescue. The Roman law comm~ntators, it says, attempt to reconcile the divergent texts of Roman law concerning the introduction
of new articles on the basis of whether the new articles are introduced
at first instance or on appeal. But the reason for the general rule, the
gloss continues, is the danger of subornation of perjury, and this danger is just as great whether the case is on appeal or still before the
judge of first instance. The true distinction, the gloss concludes, is
based on the nature of the article: Those that are new but depend on
the old may be admitted either at first instance or on appeal.221
(5) The other two citations are of less interest. "[C]onsent has no
place where force intervenes" is a direct quotation from X 4.1.14,
where it is used in quite another context.222 The invalidity, however,
of matrimonial consent obtained by force was well established.223
That a madman is present in body but absent in mind is not found
in Digest 50.17.40 but in the Accursian gloss on this passage.224 The
statement, however, was commonplace.225
Despite the paucity of citation and the pedestrian nature of those
220. X 2.20.17, gloss on novis.
221. Sed domini legum satis frivolam adhibent solutionem. Intelligunt eum
authenticum [NOVELS 90.4] in eadem causa ante sententiam diffinitivam, leges
istas [CODE 7.62.41 in causa appellationis. Sed ratio prohibitionis remanet in
eadem causa appeflationis que fuit in principali, scilicet, periculum subornationis,
et ideo quod causa remanet eadem utrobique eadem debet esse prohibitio
utrobique, et ubi est eadem ratio idem iudicium habendum est. • • • Unde
dicendum est quod apertis attestationibus ulterius non recipiantur super eisdem
articulis alii testes, et leges predicte recte possunt intelligi ut habeant locum
super novis articulis pendentibus ex prioribus, et sic concordabunt iuri
canonico ••••
X 2.20.17, gloss on novis.
222. X 4.1,14, text: "[L]ocum non habeat consensus ubi metus vel coactio intercedit." The case contains instructions to judges to provide a safe place for women
pending the trial of cases where force seems to be at stake.
223. See, e.g., TANCREDUS, SUMMA DE MARTIMONIO tit. 25, at 44 (A. Wunderlich
ed. 1841): "[Vis] ex sui natura sive constitutione ecclesiae matrimonialem consensum
ex:clusit."
224. Accunsu GLossA IN D1c:rsruM 591 (Corpus Glossatorum Juris Civilis No. 9,
1968).
225. See, e.g., DIGllST 29.7.2.3.
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authorities that are cited, these concluding sentences of the argument
are critical. The argument so far has established that affirmative
defenses, defenses that assume the truth of the first article but go on
to deny its effect by adding something to it, are admissible. Alice's
counsel must now show that her defense-that she was forced to consent to the marriage-is that kind of defense. Today we might phrase
his argument this way: Once the plaintiff has sustained his burden of
going fon'lard and the defendant has put in his evidence denying the
elements in the plaintiff's case, then, after this testimony is in, the
defendant should have an opportunity to demonstrate those things
about which he has the burden.. Alice's counsel does not make this
argument, however, because his authorities do not speak in terms of
burdens of going fon\Tard. In fact, if we leave out the general statements in the glosses, his authorities are quite thin. The only case
squarely on point is X 2.22.10, the conditional contract case, and
even that one could be distinguished on the ground that in that case
the second article was offered on appeal.
Faced with this problem, Alice's counsel plays an old lawyer's
trick. He assumes that a much more extreme case would be decided
in his favor, and then argues that his easier case should be decided
the same way: The defense of force, he says, supposes the form of
the contract but denies the substance. (True, but whoever said that
all that John had proved was the form of the contract?) Absence of
body, he continues, may be proved after the publication (who said
so?), because it is possible to have a valid contract even though one
of the contracting parties is not there. (If all that the first article
showed was that there was a contract in form, then it might be argued
that articles concerning absence could be introduced, because proof
of a contract in form would not necessarily exclude the possibility of
one of the parties being absent. But this again assumes that all that
the first article alleged was that there was a contract in form. There
is also a more fundamental problem: Proof of physical absence alone
isn't going to do the defendant any good, since the law allowed an
absent man to contract marriage by sending a messenger or a letter. 220
He is going to have to show not only that he was absent, but also that
he didn't authorize a messenger or send a letter. But if the defendant
attempts to show that neither he nor his authorized messenger nor
his letter was involved, he comes perilously close to contradicting
directly the form of contract assumed to be shown by the testimony
about the first article.) Just as one can contract validly and be absent
226. See l A. ESMEIN, LE MARIAGE
1929) and sources cited therein.

EN DROIT CANONIQUE

189-91 (R. Genestal rev. ed.
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in body, Alice's counsel continues, so one can be present in body
and absent in mind and thus not contract validly. This is the situation
of a madman or one who is coerced, both of whom are· present in
body but absent in mind. (The fundamental problem is avoided by a
neat tum of phrase. Of course one can be present in body and still
not validly contract, and one does not have to be a madman or
coerced in order to do so: One simply has not to agree to a bargain.
The question is not one of the substantive law of contract, however
much Alice's counsel would like to make us think it is; the question
is whether John's proof of contract directly or by implication included proof of freely given consent, so that introduction of proof of
absence of consent would constitute a direct denial of the prior
proof.)
How is it that our thirteenth-century lawyer who seemed capable
in the previous sentences of quite sophisticated argumentation suddenly drops into a line of argument that would make a first-year law
student blush? It is possible that he was incapable of sustaining
the effort of the previous sentences. There is nothing in the rest of
his brief that would give us much reason to trust in his abilities. 227
It is possible, too, that John's articles did not allege that the consent
was freely given or that they simply alleged a formally valid contract
and that Alice's counsel is therefore arguing, without so saying, that
only what the articles allege and not what the witnesses actually said
is to be used in determining whether a new article involves a direct
contradiction. It may also be that our Ia-wyer thought that his cause
was hopeless and that he could think of nothing better than the tum
of phrase, "absent in body and absent in mind," to conceal its weakness. A still further possibility is that he thought that the tum of
phrase solved his problem. Those who have read much in either
medieval law or medieval philosophy know that the medieval mind
put much more stock in purely verbal analysis and distinctions than
we do.
We can rescue our lawyer, however, if we assume that it was so
firmly established as not to require citation of authority that the defendant in a marriage case could introduce articles to prove his physical
absence from the scene of the alleged marriage after the plaintiff's
testimony was published and without regard to what the plaintiff's
227. See, e.g., the argument that he makes about proof of negative facts and
words, in Appendix. B infra. Here he seems to want to equate the t1110 proofs except
for the fact that proof of negative words must be accompanied by proof of circumstances. He seems to have confused totally the difference between the proof of the
absence of something (which the canonists regarded as virtually impossible) and the
proof that someone had made a negative statement.
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articles or his witnesses said. Now, there is some support for this
proposition in the decretal X 2.20.35, which Alice's counsel cites
at least by implication because it is discussed in the gloss to X 2.19.6.
Indeed, some quite respected commentators thought that X 2.20.35
meant just this: Exceptions of absence in marriage cases might be
introduced at any time.228 But the writer of the gloss on X 2.19.6 and
Raymond's rubrics on X 2.20.35 both suggested that X 2.20.35 was
aberrant. If Alice's counsel had introduced that decretal for the
proposition for which he wanted to use it, he would have undercut
the authority of a gloss on which he was relying heavily for his basic
distinctions among types of articles and would have called attention
to Raymond's questioning rubric. So Alice's counsel did not cite X
2.20.35; instead, he wrote his brief as if he assumed that the proposition he would have used it for was so obvious as not to need citation.
All this makes the argument seem a bit more clever, but it is still
a basically bad argument unless we go one step further and assume
that the judge to whom the argument was addressed would also have
assumed, without necessity for citation, that exceptions of absence
could be introduced at any time. There is some evidence that he
might have. The York court regularly229 allows the introduction of
many kinds of exceptions after the testimony has been published-a
striking divergence from the Church's common law. One of the more
frequently allowed of these exceptions is the exception of absence
in marriage cases.230 Of course, a peculiarity of York in the fourteenth
century is not necessarily a peculiarity of Canterbury in the thirteenth. But if thirteenth-century Canterbury followed the same
practice as fourteenth-century York, Alice's counsel's argument takes
on considerably more weight: Alice's counsel has just shown that the
only kinds of articles that the authorities allow to be introduced after
the testimony is published are articles that contradict the first article
only indirectly. Now, the only way to justify the regular allowance
of exceptions of physical absence under this rule is to say that, whatever the first article alleging a marriage contract says and whatever
the witnesses say, all that has been alleged and proved so far as the
rule about new articles is concerned is that there was a contract in
form. Since it is possible to have a contract in form without one of
the contracting parties being physically present, an article that al228. See text accompanying notes 214-16 supra.
229. See cases cited in note 230 infra. Cf. Alice, daughter of John Cressy c. William
Whitened, CP.E. 97 (1368) (court allows plaintiff to introduce articles on appeal that
completely change her testimony in the lower court).
230. See, e.g., Alice Malmon c. John Belamy, CP.E. 131 (1373); Marjory Spuret c.
Thomas Hornby, CP.E. 205-07, 209 (1393).
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leges that the party was not present and did not authorize such a
contract is not directly contrary to the first article for purposes of the
rule. If the rule has been stretched this far in the case of exceptions
of physical absence, surely it is not stretching it any further to admit
exceptions of mental absence. Indeed, allowing such exceptions
would not go so far, because an exception of coercion or insanity ·will
normally involve less direct contradiction of what the first article and
·witnesses have actually said and hence will involve less danger of
subornation of perjury in violation of the policy of the general rule.
One legal argument from one case is not much on which to base
conclusions about how papal law books were used in medieval England. Even when we add the rest of the arguments in Elham c. Dover
and the arguments in Picheford c. Neville, we haven't got much to go
on. But so few of these arguments have come to light that they
should be considered as carefully as possible, and some preliminary
conclusions should be drmvn.
Since neither of the modern terms "case book" or "statute book"
describes the papal law books, we should not expect to find that the
papal law books are being used in a way that fits our ideas of how
either type of authority should be used. It is not clear that even today
we could define precisely how each type of authority is to be used.
As a general matter, however, we might be able to obtain a consensus
that the holding of a case is binding (unless overruled) in situations
that have the same legally relevant facts; that the ratio decidendi
(when defined as the reason given by the judge for his decision) may,
· but need not, be binding in cases ·with different facts; and that dicta
are not binding at all, except insofar as the judge in the subsequent
case independently finds them persuasive. Statutes, on the other
hand, are absolutely binding on a judge in cases to which their
language clearly applies; their rationale may be sought only in situations where their applicability, as determined from their language, is
doubtful; and by and large they may not be used at all in situations
that their language does not, at least arguably, cover.231 Even when
the distinctions are thus simplified (and distorted), Robert's and
Alice's counsels' arguments, like those of the academic canon lawyers,
clearly cannot be fitted into either mold.
We can find uses of authority in these arguments that seem to par231. These generalizations, of course, apply only to Anglo-American law. Even
as so confined they raise numerous questions. See generally C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON,
HURST &: s. :MERMIN, THE LEGAL PROCESS 43-65, 424-54, 490-501, 504-18 (1961), and
materials cited therein; A.R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw (1968); F. FRANKFURTER,
SOME REFLECrIONS ON THE READING OF STATUTES (1947); J. MONTROSE, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAw AND OTHER ESSAYS (1968).

w.
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take more of the statutory approach. For example, in Robert's raciones232 the principle that the Prior of Bradley had no authority to
execute his sentence is supported by citation to a decretal233 the
dispositive part of which states that, in an advowson case that the
pope has delegated for trial, the winner should be presented by the
judge delegate to the bishop, and the bishop, not the judge, should
institute him to the benefice he has won. Viewed as an Anglo-American common law case, the decretal is quite distinguishable from
Robert's situation because in the decretal it was the bishop and not
the defeated party who was -complaining, and the rationale of the
decision is that the delegation of the case should not be presumed to
defeat episcopal rights, something, not involved in the Picheford case,
since the bishop had instituted Thomas Neville. Thus, Robert's counsel is here using a case as if it were a statute.
On the other hand, Alice's counsel uses X 2.20.33 in a way in
which a statute could not be used~ The dispositive part of this decretal
states simply that the case is to be remanded for the taking of new
testimony on the question of whether the defendant was disqualified
to hold ecclesiastical office. The witnesses, the pope notes, may include suitable laymen or women. The case is collected for the proposition that laymen and women may testify about impediments to
holding ecclesiastical offices. It is only if one reads the entire case that
one realizes that the holding, although not the language of the case,
also supports the proposition for which Alice's counsel used it: that in
certain circumstances new testimony can be taken even after the
testimony of other witnesses on the same issue has been published.234
Sometimes the citations show a search for the underlying rationale
of a decretal in a way that is quite different from the way either
cases or statutes are used in Anglo-American jurisdictions. For example, Robert's counsel, having established the general proposition
that nothing should be innovated pending appeal, wishes to demonstrate that, pending appeal, the possession of a benefice should not be
disturbed. He cites for this proposition a decretal230 that does not
concern pending appeals at all, but, rather, holds that one who asks
the pope to provide him to a benefice must mention that the benefice
is possessed by another even if the possession is de facto only and not
de jure. The rationale of this decretal, Robert's counsel seems to be
telling us, is the same as the one he is seeking to have applied to this
232.
233.
234.
235.

See text accompanying notes 192-94 supra.
X 1.29.15.
See text between notes 216-17 supra.
X 3.8.6.
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case: Possession of a benefice should not be disturbed unless and until
there is a final judicial determination of the -underlying right.
· In fact, as Alice's counsel's argument indicates,236 the way in
which these authorities were used can only be described as eclectic.
We can, and the commentators will give us some support in this,237
arrange the authorities he uses into a hierarchy. First come papal
pronouncements, of whatever type, the more recent taking precedence
over the more ancient; next, decrees of local councils, those from the
area in which the court is sitting taking precedence over those in
other areas; next, in a somewhat shadowy status, Roman law; and
finally, academic commentary. We can also, if we choose, classify
authorities by types: decrees of general and local councils being most
like statutes, papal decrees being almost the same, decisions by the
popes in actual litigated cases being most like Anglo-American cases,
and papal answers to questions-real or hypothetical-falling someplace in between. The arguments, however, give us no indication that
such distinctions made any difference. It is all law; it is all authoritative; and it is all to be manipulated by whatever means come to hand,
always, if our reading of Alice's argument is correct, with a keen
awareness of the custom of the court to which the argument is addressed.238
Of ~ourse, in a case of direct conflict the hierarchy suggested
above might dictate which rule would apply, although there would be
some doubt as to where custom would fit on the scale. But direct
conflicts are rare, particularly since the academic method of the .
236. See text accompanying notes 204-30 supra.
237. See Kuttner, supra note 184, at 309-10, for the suggestion that the hierarchy, if
it was used at all, was used only for the purpose of determining whether an authority
should be admitted to the common law of the church. Once admitted, conflicting
authorities were reconciled by other means. See also G. LE BRAS, C. LEFEBVRE & J.
RAMBAUD, supra note 187, at 396-405.
238. Of course, Alice's counsel's arg!fment is not the only evidence that we have
of the importance of the custom of the court. See text accompanying notes 129-43,
152-68 supra for discussion of the custom of the York court with regard to tuitorlal
appeal and the use of custom as a supplement to papal substantive law. On the
other hand, I am not suggesting that either the manipulation of the contents of the
law books or the reliance on custom was peculiar to the English ecclesiastical courts.
A glance at the surviving fourteenth-century judgments of the Roman Rota indicates
that more careful analysis would show that the auditors of the Rota manipulated the
law in the same way that Robert's and Alice's counsel did. See, e.g., BERNARDUS DE
BISIGNETO, DECISIONES, tit. de testibus, decisio 1 (before 1365), in ROTAE AUDITORUM
DECISIONES NOVAE, ANTIQUAE ET ANTIQUIORES (Venice ed. 1570) (contains two citations
to the Digest, one to the Decretals, and one to a gloss on the Decretals). Certainly
they did so in later periods. See generally J. NooN,AN, POWER ro DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND
MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA (1972). Tancred's famous early
thirteenth-century tract on procedure, Ordo Judiciarius, shows the same keen awareness of the importance of the custom of the church court of Bologna, with which
he was intimately familiar. E.g., TANCREDus, supra note 175, at 279-80.
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lawyers of this tradition greatly preferred reconciling conflicting
authorities to selecting which of two conflicting authorities was of
more weight. 239 Of course, the way in which the authorities were
manipulated depended on their nature. Thus, a seeming conflict
between two actual cases could be reconciled on the basis of the
facts. 240 On the other hand, where the decretal was an abstract answer
to an abstract hypothetical question, the manipulation had to be
verbal. For example, when the pope, in an answer to a hypothetical
question, referred to "new articles in appeal cases," he meant articles
that depended on the old articles but did not contradict them. 241
Further, in the light of previous authority, including Roman law,
the rule announced need not be confined to appeal cases but could
be applied to "new" articles at any stage of the proceedings. 242
In conclusion, then, the distinction between statutes and cases
will not take us very far. It will take us this far, however: If Maitland
meant to imply by "absolutely binding statute law" that the English
ecclesiastical courts rigidly adhered to the letter of what was contained in the papal law books, and if what Stubbs and Kemp meant
by their reference to case law was that there was quite a bit of room
for interpretation of what was in the papal law books, then Stubbs
and Kemp have the better of the argument, at least so far as we can
tell from the evidence now before us.
The effect of this malleable quality of papal law on the attitude
of the judges of the ecclesiastical courts toward the binding quality
of that law must, because of the sparseness of the evidence examined
to date, remain problematical. That the judges would, at least at
times, manipulate the law in arriving at their judgments may fairly
be inferred from the briefs we have examined; othenvise, it would
have been foolish to write them. We have no direct evidence, however, that the judges thought that they were manipulating the law in
order to arrive at their own body of law, different from if not completely at odds with papal law, and we may simply be witnessing
an instance of the general phenomenon that no body of law, and
certainly not medieval canon law, can be applied to the limitless
variety of human situations that come before the courts without considerable manipulation. There may, however, be some indirect evi239. See generally

s.

KUTINER, HARMONY FROM DISSONANCE: AN INTERPRETATION OF

(1960).
240. E.g., the resolution of the seeming conflict between X 2.20.35 and X 2,19,6
by some commentators on the basis of the fact that the former case involved a contract
to marry, the latter an actual marriage. See text accompanying notes 213-16 suJ,ra,
241. See text accompanying note 220 supra.
242. Id.
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dence of judicial attitude to the law that can be derived from the
nature of the English courts Christian as an institution. We will
address this question as we attempt to draw some tentative conclusions.

IV.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

The Stubbs-Maitland debate and the ensuing scholarship suggest that the binding quality of papal law in England may be viewed
in the light of three sets of variables: (1) the institutions in question,
(2) the time in question, and (3) the type of case involved: 243
(1) Stubbs, as Maitland points out,244 is guilty of failing to distinguish carefully between the position of the kings vis-a-vis the pope
and that of the English church vis-a-vis the pope. Stubbs assumed that
the position of the king and what he was able to enforce were the
same thing as the position of the English church and what it consented to. The records of the church courts provide us little direct
information about the king-pope relationship, but they do tell us
something about the king-English church and English church-pope
relationships.245
So far as the relationship between the king and the English church
243. There is one more variable of obvious significance: the similarities or differences between the binding quality of papal law in England and on the continent.
Stubbs' arguments would suggest that papal law was less binding in England than
on the continent, Maitland's that it was at least as binding, if not more so. In
order to get some feel for the question, it would be necessary to look at the surviving
records of the continental ecclesiastical courts in somewhat the same way that I
have looked at the English records and then draw the comparison. I have not done
so in this paper both because of limits of time and space and because of my unfamiliarity with the continental records. What little work I have been able to do
would indicate that the differences were ones of detail but not of over-all effect.
For example, in France the church was apparently more successful than in England
in obtaining jurisdiction over the crimes of clerks as a matter of first instance, but
less successful in seeing to it that the criminous clerk was not subject to secular
punishment after the church courts were through with him. Compare L. GABEL,
BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE I.ATER MIDDLE AGES (Smith College Studies in
History No. 14, 1929); Cheney, The Punishment of Felonious Clerks, 51 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REv. 215 (1936); and Maitland, Henry II and the Criminous Clerks, 'l ENGLISH
HISTORICAL REv. 224 (1892), reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 132, with
P. FOURNIER, supra note 87, at 64-77, 94-127; R. GENESTAL, LE PRIVILEGIUM Foru IN
FRANCE (1922); and o. MARTIN, L'AssEMBLEE DE VINCENNES DE 1329 ET SES CONSEQUENCES
(1909).

The full comparative study remains to be done, however, and France, because of
its fine archival tradition, strikes me as a good place to start. See also R. BRENTANO,
Two CHURCHES: ENGLAND AND ITALY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY (1968).
244. Maitland, supra note 28, at 641-42, reprinted in F. MAITLAND, supra note 19,
at 51-53.
245. Recent research would add yet a fourth force, that of the lay magnates.
See, e.g., W. PANTIN, supra note 29, at 82-84. For our purposes, however, we can
regard the lay magnates as being part of the king's side, since at least the York records
show little evidence that the lay magnates, independent of the king, exercised pressure
on the court.
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is concerned, the evidence indicates that the church courts were quite
independent of the king's law, but this independence should not be
exaggerated. The church courts depended on the king to bring physical force to bear in support of their jurisdiction and sanctions; 240
they were subject to having cases being heard before them prohibited;
and they aided the king's courts by making rulings about matters
peculiarly within their own competence.247 Further, there is considerable evidence that litigants did not regard the choice of one
forum as precluding choice of the other but pursued remedies in two
or more fora serially or even concurrently as it suited their purposes.24s
· On the other hand, the king's law definitely was not the church's
law. The citations of authorities from Canterbury and the decided
cases from York show us clearly that the "Roman canon law" supplemented by local ecclesiastical statute and custom were the authorities to which the church courts turned to decide cases. There are
only t:11ro documents in the entire collection that even suggest an
influence of the king's law on the law the church courts were applying.249 The blanket rejection of the attempt by counsel in Flemyng
246. See generally F. LoGAN, supra note 138.
247. See, e.g., Katherine, widow of John Hiliard c. Peter, son of the same, CP.E.
108-09 (1370), where the king's court asks the York court to determine a marriage
question in connection with a dower action brought before the king's court.
248. E.g., in Thomas Kendall c. Henry, Rector of Foston, CP.E, 193 (1391), Thomas
and his wife, executors of the will of one Peter Wolffe, aileged that Henry had goods
of their deceased in his possession. They sued out a writ of trespass d.b.a. against
Henry in the king's court and concurrently sued him for impeding the execution of
the will in the York court. In William Chese c. Katherine, widow of Henry Axiholm,
CP.E. 217, 218-20 (1395) (see note 97 supra) the parties pursued the matter, at various
times, before the York court, the king's court, the court of the mayor and bailiffs of
York, and specially chosen arbitrators.
249. In Robert Applegarth, Late Rector of Ail Saints' Northgate c. Executors of Sir
Robert Hannsard, Kt., CP.E. 192 (1391), we find an extraordinary run of terms that
must reflect, although somewhat confusedly, common law influence. The case concerns the Rector's ciaim to be entitled to one fourth of the candles and candelabra
(or their value) used at Hannsard's funeral, even though the funeral had not taken
place at Ail Saints', because Hannsard was a parishioner of All Saints'. The interesting thing, for our purposes, is what the Rector aIIeges that the executors did with the
candles: They took them (ceperunt) from the church in which the funeral took place,
asported (asportaverunt) them, and converted them to their own use (converterunt acl
usum suum). The taking and asportation claims are the standard ones in the writ of
trespass de bonis asportatis. See, e.g., EARLY REc1sr£RS OF WRITS, mpra note 64, at 175
(no. 285). Conversion, however, was not a separate tort at common law until the sixteenth century, but the phrase "converted to his own use" does appear in common
law sources of this time, frequently to describe the wrongful action of an executor.
See s. Mn.sOM, HISI'ORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 322-23 (1969). See also
id. at 321-32. To my knowledge, none of these phrases is used in the academic
romano-canon law.
In the libel in John Stanton, as curator of William, son of Geoffrey Smith c.
Nicholas, son of Hugh Young, CP.E. 24lr (1358), we find the phrase "devcnerunt ad
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c. St. Alban's to plead the king's law as local custom250 and the total
absence of any argument based on the king's law about church court
jurisdiction characterize the attitude of the court to the king's law.
We should not, however, get the impression that because the
church courts were independent of the king, the relations between
the two were necessarily strained, despite the seemingly irreconcilable
statements of jurisdictional principle that we find in the gravamina,
on the one hand, and in the prohibition ·writs and such statutory documents as Articuli Cleri, on the other. The considerable areas of
cooperation indicate quite the contrary. Even the operations of the
prohibition system, at least as viewed from the York court, inay be
seen as the product of a working, probably tacit, compromise.251 On
its side the York court seems to have obeyed those prohibitions that
it received; on his side the king permitted those litigants who chose
to undertake the trouble and expense of a trip to Westminster to
remove certain types of cases to his courts, but did not seek to prohibit cases on his mvn motion. The result was that many cases that
could have been prohibited were heard by the York court.
The relationship between the English church courts and the pope
operated on both an' institutional and a legal plane. On the institutional plane the Court of Rome took many, but not all, important
cases to itself, but the English courts exercised an important :filtering
function through the grant or denial of tuition. On the legal plane,
the courts applied, and felt themselves bound by, the papal law books,
but supplemented these books in a number of sigificant areas by local
statute and custom. Further, the papal law was subject to considerable
manipulation in its application to specific cases. The relationship
might be characterized as one of great deference but not of blind
adherence.
manus" used to describe the wrongful detention of chattel that had been bequeathed
to the pla~ntiff. I know of no use of this phrase in academic romano-canon law; on
the other hand, it played a considerable part in the development of the writ of detinue.
See S. MILSOIII, supra, at 233-34.
Another possible influence of the common law is the idea of "legal memory" (see
1 F. POLLOCK &: F. :MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 168) found in the pleadings in immemorial custom cases. See, e.g., text accompanying note 169 supra. But the presence of
these ideas in both canon and common law may reflect a common Roman antecedent.
See generally R. WHERLE, supra note 171.
250. See text accompanying notes 88-91 supra.
251. One bit of evidence supporting the hypothesis that such a compromise was
made is the fact that, to my knowledge, the king made no attempt to limit the church
courts' jurisdiction on his own motion, after the unsuccessful attempt to do so in
Norfolk in 1286. The king's abandonment of this Norfolk effort is the immediate
cause of the document known as Circumspecte Agatis. See note 107 supra and authorities cited therein.
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In s~mmary, royal interference was not such that papal law can,
as a practical matter, be said not to be binding because the king prevents it from so being. On the other hand, the nature of the church
courts as institutions, the sources of the law applied in them, and the
way in which they applied the papal law considerably reduced the
importance, if they did not change the binding quality, of papal law.
(2) Both Stubbs and Maitland speak at times as if the period
from Becket to Henry VIII were all of a piece. We know, however,
that the political influence of the papacy in England changed considerably over this period.252 Do the church court records provide
any evidence that these changes were accompanied by corresponding
changes in the binding quality of papal law?
The records show some changes in the fourteenth century that
may reflect the decline of papal power associated with the Avignon
papacy. Writing of the period 1198-1254, Jane Sayers states that all
ecclesiastical cases of any importance went to Rome, and that those
that were not heard there were heard by judges in England specially
delegated for the purpose.253 Our examination of the York records
has shown that this is not true for York in the fourteenth century.
In theory, of course, the pope remains universal ordinary, and any
case may be brought to him at any stage of the proceeding. In practice,
however, the universal ordinary is not universal to quite the same
extent in the fourteenth century that he was in the thirteenth. Cases
still come to him, but not all important cases, and judges delegate
are not nearly so much in evidence, their place having been taken, at
least in part, by the local ecclesiastical courts. Significantly, of the
six delegations mentioned in the York records, two are to the Archbishop of York and one is to his Official.254 All three cases are heard
in the regular channels of the York court. These changes do not
necessarily imply a change in the binding power of papal law, but
they do show that the local ecclesiastical courts are becoming institutionally more independent of the pope.
The relationship between the king and the church courts, as
viewed at least from York, does not seem to change much until the
end of the fourteenth century. The first statutes of Provisors and
Praemunire (1351, 1353)255 seem to have had little effect on the York
252. See generally THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY IN nm MIDDLE AGES (C,
Lawrence ed. 1965).
253. J. SAYERS, supra note 25, at x..xiv-x.·w. She notes, however, that the beginnings
of the decline of the institution were shortly after the end of her period. Id. at 276-'1'1,
254. See note 128 supra.
255. 25 Edw. 3, stat. 4 (1351); 27 Edw. 3, stat. 1, c. 1 (1353).
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court's practice of hearing benefice cases.256 The second set of such
statutes (1390, 1393),257 however, do seem to have had an effect, resulting, for a time, in the disappearance of benefice cases from the cause
papers.258 Since over two thirds of the benefice cases had been tuitorial
appeals, the change is more at the expense of the Roman court's juris-'
diction than of the York court's. Other prohibitable types of cases
continue, and, indeed, contract cases increase in the same period.
On the whole, however, these changes are slight. There is no
perceptible change in attitude toward papal law or the uses to which
it was put. The records exist for carrying the study on into the fifteenth century (where we might expect to find a decline in papal
influence), but, unfortunately, the work remains to be done.
(3) Both Stubbs and Maitland write on the question of the binding quality of papal law irrespective of the type of case in which it is
to be applied. They ignore the distinction between laws that are
enforced only if some private party seeks to have them enforced and
laws that the law-giver or his agents enforce on their own motion-in
short, the distinction between what we today call civil and criminal
law and what the canonists called instance and office cases.259 Some
scholars seem to suggest that some of the papal law, although intended
to be enforced as criminal law, was only enforced if the private party
sought i.ts enforcement, and hence that it was less binding than intended.200
Unfortunately, the evidence we have examined in this Article
affords little opportunity to compare instance and office cases. The
only office cases that survive from the York Consistory Court records
of the fourteenth century are cases in which the official is seeking to
enforce one of his own orders in an instance matter. 261 There were

-~

256. See Table I supra.
257. 13 Rich. 2, stat. 2, cc. 2-3 (1390); 16 Rich. 2, c. 5 (1393).
258. See text accompanying notes 111-14 supra.
259. Like most analogies, the statement "civil cases : criminal cases :: office matters :
instance matters" is not quite exact. In addition to instance matters and "pure"
office matters (negocia ex officio mero), the English canon law also recognized a hybrid
-"promoted" office matters (negocia ex officio promoto). These last were roughly
equivalent to private criminal prosecutions. See B. WooncoCK, supra note 68, at 5062, 68-71. Further, the remedy sought in many straight instance cases, excommunication of the defendant, would probably be regarded today as penal rather than civil.
See text accompanying notes 106-09 supra. Finally, in office matters it is the judge,
by virtue of his office, and not the state or the crown (or the Church), who is the
nominal party plaintiff, and, except in promoted office matters, there seems to
have been no one who performed the function of the modern prosecutor. See B.
WooDCOCK, supra.
260. See A. OGLE, supra note 30; Gray, supra note 39.
261. E.g., Archbishop of York c. Prior & Convent of Nostell, CP.E. 57 (1343)
(prosecution for violation of a sequestration order).
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indubitably other kinds of office cases heard in York in this period,
but the surviving records strongly suggest that they were heard by
some other court. The situation in thirteenth-century Canterbury
is less clear, but the records of office matters that have come to light
have not yet been examined in sufficient depth for us to know whether
they are detailed and copious enough to permit comparisons of the
law being applied with that being applied in instance matters.
The office records that the author has examined are not very helpful. For example, the earliest act book of the Court of the Dean and
Chapter of York consists of brief and generally unhelpful entries in
what appear to be predominantly cases of fornication. 262 If the complex papal rules concerning, let us say, pluralism (the holding of more
than one benefice) were being enforced at all, it is doubtful that we
will find records of their enforcement in this type of court.263 It seems
more likely that such matters would not have been handled in a
lower level "bawdy court"264 but by the archbishop or bishop personally, either during visitations or in his personal court of audience.
Unfortunately, visitation and audience records for our period do not
seem to have had a high survival rate, and, again, more work needs to
be done with those that have survived.
There is, however, one final element20 u in the instance records that
we have examined that has some bearing on the Stubbs-Maitland
debate: Without too much overreading, we can get from Stubbs a
picture of an embattled English church struggling to enforce native
English law and custom against an ever-increasing flood of bulls, "hot
from Rome."266 On the other hand, again without too much overreading, we can get from Maitland a picture of an equally embattled
English church struggling to enforce every jot and tittle of the papal
law in the face of ever-increasing royal pressure to limit the field of
application of that law. If we read at least the instance records of the
ecclesiastical courts, however, we do not get the picture of an em262. D/C.AB. 1 (1387-1494), found in Borthwick Institute, York, described in J.
PURVIS, A MEDIAEVAL Acr BooK WITH SO.ME ACCOUNT OF ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICflON
AT YORK (1943).
263. The same can be said of an issue deeply involved in the Becket controversy,
the prosecution of felonious clerks. See note 243 supra.
264. See BEFORE THE BAWDY COURT: SELECTIONS FRO!II CHURCH COURT RECORDS (P.
Hair ed. 1972).
265. In addition to my own research, I have drawn on the following for these con•
eluding remarks: J. SAYERS, supra note 25; R. Helmholz, Marriage Litigation in
Medieval England (unpublished manuscript); Morris, A Consistory Court in the Middle
Ages, 14 J. ECCLESIASTICAL HlsTORY 150 (1963).
266. I am indebted for this phrase to Geoffrey Chaucer. See G. CHAUCER, General
Prologue, in THE CANTERBURY TALES, fragment I (group A), line 687 {the Pardoner),
in THE WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER 23 (2d ed. F. Robinson 1957).
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battled institution at all, and we find strikingly little evidence of
substantive law.
Most of the cases never reach the sentence stage. They are either
abandoned by the plaintiff or compromised.267 Litigation is controlled
by the parties. If they do not choose to force an issue, the court rarely
does. There is even some evidence that the York court positively discouraged the litigants from obtaining a sentence, for it charged litigants a very high fee for the sentence in comparison to the fees that it
charged at other stages of the proceedings.268
Rarely do we see the court taking an active role in the litigation
beyond making procedural rulings. Even in marriage cases we see
little evidence that the court felt that the law, papal or local, should
be enforced if the parties to the case did not seek its enforcement.
In fact, if we seek a modem analogy to the court's function, arbitration, rather than adjudication, comes more immediately to mind.
We have seen how, on many occasions, the papal law gets lost in
local law or cusom. The phenomenon is of broader applicability.
Time and again substantive law is entirely lost in the specifics of the
dispute; the general gives way to the particular. It may be that the
reason why so few records of legal argument survive is that legal
arguments just weren't very important.
'
Now, there should be nothing surprising to the student of the
legal system today that far more cases were filed in York than ever
reached sentence. Far more cases are filed today than ever reach
judgment, and there is no reason why we should think that this
characteristic of litigation is a purely modem phenomenon. Since
the York court was primai:ily a court of first instance, it ·also should
not surprise us that the facts of the case and adjective law are far
more important than substantive law. We are familiar today with
267. The records, unfortunately, do not allow us to determine precisely what
percentage of the cases were abandoned and what percentage compromised, nor can
we be completely sure that some of the cases did not reach the sentence stage, the
sentence now being lost. This last possibility, however, would not explain the large
number of cases that never reach a sentence in the act books, even though the acta
of the court go on.
268. E.g., Alice, wife of John Clerk c. William de Stapleton, CP.E. 196 (1393).
This is a straightforward defamation case in which Alice alleges that William falsely
accused her of stealing a robe and a kerchief and receives judgment in her favor. The
list of expenses that she claims is long and complicated, and the figures do not seem
to add up to the total. Be that as it may be, lls.13d. arc identifiable on the list as
having been paid to the court or its officers. Of this sum 7s.Bd. were paid at the
sentence stage: 2s. "for the sentence," 4d. "for the summoner" (at the sentence stage),
2s.18d. "for citing the defendant anew," and 2s.6d. "for execution of the sentence."
Expenses this high at the sentence stage are by no means atypical. See, e.g., William
Mowbray, Rector of Normanby c. Thomas Crathorne, CP.E. 177 (1390); Marjory Spuret
c. Thomas de Hornby, CP.E. 205-07, 209 (1394).
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trial judges who actively encourage settlement, and many modem
judges, not only trial judges, do not regard it as their function in
civil cases to enforce the law to any greater extent than the parties
ask them to enforce it. The striking thing about the York court is not
the presence of these characteristics but their dominance. The relative
unimportance of substantive law characterizes not only first instance
cases but also appeal cases, where we might expect to find substantive
law more important. The encouragement of settlement prevailed
despite a relati_vely uncrowded docket-docket overload being
thought to be the chief source today of pressure on judges to get
cases settled. And the passive attitude of the court toward the enforcement of substantive law is found in the court of an institution that,
unlike today's state, felt that the enforcement of its laws was its duty
so that men's souls might thereby be saved.
Now, all of this does not make the papal law any less binding,
but it does make it considerably less important. Earlier we suggested
that it was somewhat paradoxical that the York court seems to have
been a strong institution despite the fact that papal law was binding
upon it. Its strength is paradoxical, however, only if the enforcement
of papal law was an important element in the court's function and
was so perceived by the participants in the process. Much of what we
have found about the court would indicate that it was not. Many of
the cases it heard involved claims based on local statute or custom,
with papal law only indirectly involved. The way that papal law was
applied in those cases where it was directly involved seems to have
given the court considerable leeway in choosing a rule for the case.
Further, many cases were settled or compromised, and there is no
suggestion that the court felt compelled to see that these settlements
or compromises accorded with the papal law.
The relative unimportance of papal law suggests that the York
court was not viewed by contemporary society, and perhaps that it
was not viewed by the personnel of the court themselves, primarily
as the place where papal law was enforced but, rather, as one of a
number of alternative places where disputes could be resolved. The
court would summon litigants before it; it would fix, where necessary,
the position of the litigants during the pendency of the dispute; it
would provide a quite sophisticated mechanism for bringing to light
the facts of the case; and it would listen to the arguments on each side.
It would even render a judgment within the broad confines of the law
found in the papal law books, if•the litigants insisted upon it. But
rendering judgments was not what the court spent the vast bulk of
its time doing, nor was it the way that most cases were terminated.
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Most of the records are devoted to the process itself, not to the end
result. Perhaps this is because the process was the important thing,269
and the desired result was not a sentence by the judge but accord
between the parties.
Maitland's Lyndwood essay closes with a vivid imaginary conversation between Lyndwood and Majtland in which Maitland suggests the Stubbs position to Lyndwood and Lyndwood replies that if
Maitland persists in that view he ·will. be turned over to the secular
arm to be burned.270 Perhaps we should recast that conversation in
the light of what we have said above: "My dear fellow," we would
have Lyndwood say to Maitland's posing of the Stubbs view, "if you
are making that proposition to me because I am a doctor of laws and
have written a book called Provinciale, I would have to tell you that
if you propose that view in a disputation I will demolish it, and if
you put that view into a book, I will do my best to have the book
burned. Indeed, if that view were yours and you persisted in it, you
might well be burned too. But I know it is not your view, but that of
the heretical Bishop of Oxford, and that your ovm view is much closer
to the mind of Holy Mother the Church, however peculiar your
views on other matters may be.
"But if you are asking me this question because I am the Official
of the Court of Canterbury, then I will tell you that we at the court
have found your whole debate with Bishop Stubbs somewhat beside
the point. You are talking of matters that concern kings and popes
and professors. We, on the other hand, see before us every day men
whose souls are in peril because they are quarreling. If one of them
persists in offending his brother, Our Lord tells us271 that we must
cast him out from the Church, and if we do and he remains unrepentant, he will surely be damned. But what of him who has had his
brother cast out and what of us who have done ~e casting? Shall
0

t~

269. The preceding paragraphs in the text suggest what role the judge in medieval
canon law in fact played, to the extent that we can determine this from the court
records. If I am right, there are obvious implications for the study of the judicial
function in the broad. See generally G. DAWSON, supra note 190. Even if the medieval
ecclesiastical judges were acting more as arbitrators than as enforcers of the law,
however, there still remains the question of the extent to which they were a~vare
of this fact. The academic canon law provides some indication that they were aware
and that they were playing just the role that the canon law had designed for them.
I can do no more at this point than suggest that the topic merits further consideration on another occasion. See generally G. LE BRAS, C. LEFEBVRE & J. RAMBAUD, supra
note 187, at 416-20, 446-59; 6 DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT CANONIQUE ]uge (Recours a
l'Office du) 208 (1957),
270. Maitland, supra note 20, at 475-76, reprinted in F. MArrLAND, supra note 19,
at 45-46.
271. Matthew 18:17.
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we not have to answer before the judgment seat for the damnation
of one for whom Christ died? How much better it would be if the
quarrel ceased and peace were restored, for as the Apostle tells us
'there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with
another'272 and again, in another place, 'but the greatest of these is
charity.' "273
APPENDIX A

A Note on Statistics
Much survives from the medieval English ecclesiastical courts,
but what survives shows us that much more has been lost. The extent
to which we can make meaningful generalizations about the whole
and not just about the portion that has survived depends on the
surviving records' being fairly typical of the whole. The extent to
which we can make meaningful statistical statements about the whole
depends on much more: The surviving records must be a random
sample of the whole.
In the process of trying to determine whether the surviving
fourteenth-century York cause papers are a random sample of all the
cause papers filed in York for that century, I have convinced myself
that the surviving papers are, at the least, "fairly typical" of the whole.
Nothing that I have found in the fourteenth-century act book fragments or in the fuller act books from the early portions of the fifteenth
century would lead one to believe tha~ any given type of case was
systematically culled from the cause papers or that any given type
of case has been preferred for selection. Thus, most of the statements
made in this paper about the general nature of the York jurisdiction
in the fourteenth century seem to be valid when judged against the
criterion of "fair typicality."
In a few places, however, I have gone further and have tried to
make statements about (a) the proportions of types of cases actually
heard in the consistory court during the century (note 63 supra) and
(b) the significance of the absence of benefice cases from the surviving
cause papers for the years 1390-1399 (note 111 supra). Although my
thesis does not stand or fall on either of these statements, they do
help to round out the picture, and they represent an attempt to use
church court records in a way that, to my knowledge, they have not
been used before. Some explanation, then, of the assumptions made
and techniques used may be useful.
Both the note 63 proportions and the note 111 significance test
are valid only if the surviving cause papers are a random sample.
That they are cannot be irrefutably proved. The records of the
272. 1 Corinthians 6:7.
273. Id. 13:13.
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underlying population of cases have been lost, and, however the
records were kept, their preservation clearly did not depend on the
use of a random number table. The randomness of the sample must .
be shown, if at all, from inferences drawn from the nature of what
has survived and what we know about the history. of how the records
were kept.
Two hypotheses as to why these particular records survived come
immediately to mind. The process by which the other records have
been lost could be an essentially random one. Damp, fire, dust, casual
loss, and random destruction (for example, throwing out all the
records on the top of randomly sorted piles) could have taken their
toll over the centuries until we are left with what we have now.
Alternatively, someone at some period could have made selections
from the papers for whatever purpose and have destroyed the rest.
The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive; various combinations of haphazard and conscious processes could have resulted in the
loss or destruction of those records that do not survive.
The nature of the records today lends support to the "notion that
their survival is the result of haphazard, if not random, processes.
Most of the fourteenth-century cause papers were written on parchment, and parchment is tough stuff. But the 600-odd years that separate us from the time the cause papers were written have taken their
toll. There is no evidence of fire visible on the records themselves,
but there is some evidence of damp and a great deal of evidence of
dust, apparently coal dust. This dust has reduced many of the records to an extremely fragile state, some to the point of illegibility.
It is not hard to imagine that some of the original sets of records
simply disintegrated over time. Further, there is considerable evidence of rough treatment. Many of the records are tom, particularly
on the edges, and virtually all of them were folded or rolled many
times, processes that lead to cracking and further disintegration, particularly as the parchment dries out.
The surviving records show little indication that they have been
consciously selected for preservation as a part of a general housecleaning in which other records were discarded. There is no perceptible pattern in the persons, places, or legal issues involved in the
cases. Unusual cases and routine cases, files containing over fifty
documents and files containing just one document are jumbled together in a seemingly haphazard fashion. Indeed, from the time that
the fourteenth-century endorsements were placed on the records to
the time when they were re-endorsed in the nineteenth century, there
is no evidence that anyone attempted to sort the documents, much
less cull them.
There are three possible exceptions to these generalizations. First,
one file (CP .E. 107) contains three cases, one each from the early
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fourteenth, late fourteenth, and early fifteenth centuries, all of which
deal ·with the same parish church. While this grouping may have
occurred in the nineteenth century, it is possible that these causes
were gathered together as precedep.ts either for the fifteenth-century
case or for some lat.~r case involving the same church. There is, however, no other grouping of this sort, and one biased selection does not
seriously jeopardize the randomness of a sample of over 200 cases.
Second, there is one file (CP.E. 241) that contains single documents
from a miscellany of fourteenth-century cases. Although no particular
pattern can be discerned in these cases, the documents may have
been culled from the files at some time for the purpose of compiling
a collection of precedents. There is, however, no evidence that these
documents were grouped together before the cause papers were
sorted and modern numbers assigned to them at the Borthwick, and
it may have been convenient at that time to put all the one-document
files together. Third, there is a run of cases from the 1380's in which
the names of two proctors appear with disturbing regularity. 274
While the possibility that these cases survive from the private collections of these proctors cannot be completely excluded, the evidence
would seem to point in another direction: With few exceptions what
survives is the court's copy of the documents. This appears from the
fact that they contain the registry endorsement telling who filed the
document and when. Further, there are breaks in the run---cases in
which the name of neither proctor appears.27G Finally, the number of
proctors admitted to practice before the court was probably quite
small, and the number of active proctors even smaller.276 It is quite
274. The regular practice of endorsing the document with the name of the proctor
who filed it begins in the York courts around the middle of the 1360's. From this
time onwards we can get a fairly good idea of who the proctors were. Beginning
in 1380 and extending to 1389, for a run of twenty-five cases, the name of either
Nicholas Esyngwald or John Stanton, Jr., appears in all but two sets of papers, In
eight cases both men appear either on the same or opposite sides. The two e....:ceptions
are cases in which the name of the proctor on only one side is recorded; hence it is
possible that either Stanton or Esyngwald represented the other side. Of course,
other proctors' names appear as well and not all the documents in these cases were
filed in either Stanton's or Esyngwald's name. There is a possibility, however, that
both of them collected documents in cases in which they were involved and that these
documents form the basis of the current collection for this decade. Even if this were
true, our random sample would not completely collapse. The decade lll80-llJ89 looks
very much like the other decades in terms of the types of cases heard. See Table I
supra. Further, for reasons stated in the text infra, I am inclined to the view that
the Stanton-Esyngwald private collection hypothesis is implausible,
275. CP.E. 124 (1381); CP.E, 146 (1386). See note 274 supra.
276. In 1311, Archbishop Greenfield limited the number of proctors that could be
admitted to practice before the court to eight. 2 D. WILKINS, CONCILIA l\fAGNAE
BRITANNIAE ET HmERNIAE 410 (1737). This number seems to have been held constant.
At least, we find evidence of its being held to eight in both the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. See R. MARCHANT, Tm: CHURCH UNDER THE LAw: JusrICE, ADMINISTRATION
AND DISCIPLINE IN THE DIOCESE OF YoRK, 1560-1640, at 55-56 (1969); K. Burns, The Administrative System of the Ecclesiastical Courts in the Diocese and Province of York:
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conceivable that two proctors took one or the other side of virtually
every case heard during this period.
·
What little is known of the history of these records also tends to
support the notion that the survival of these particular cause papers
was the product of an essentially random process. That the court had
a registrar (chief clerk) in the fourteenth century may be determined
from the numerous references to this officer in the cause papers
themselves.277 No evidence, however, has come to my attention that
would indicate where the registrar had his registry and what the
relation was benv-een his office and that of the Archbishop's registrar.
At some time, probably quite early on, the cause papers found their
way into the keeping of the York diocesan registrar where they were
kept with a much larger set of records.
The glimpses that we have of how the diocesan records were kept
are depressing to the archivist but encouraging to the historical
statistician looking for evidence of a random process of survival.
Thomas Jubb, the Registrar in the early eighteenth century, reports:21s
In the search made from the Restauration till 1714 when Mr.
Mawde dyed and I Thomas Jubb was made Registrar for the Dean
and Chapter of York the following things are to be observed.

I. That when I entered upon the said office every thing was in
great disorder and confusion and so indeed Mr. Mawde found that
Office at Mr. Squire's death.
The "great disorder and confusion" is probably a result of the seige
and occupation of York by Cromwell's troops. Indeed, in the same
report Jubb notes that during the "Troublesome Times" the registry
office was gutted and loose papers destroyed,279
In his contribution to the First Report on the Public Records
in 1800 the then-Deputy Registrar, Joseph Buckle, notes, perhaps
overly optimistically, that the records were secure from fire and damp
and that certain classes of older records were dirty, injured, and
mutilated.280
Finally, the Reverend Canon J. S. Purvis, the first director of
the Borthwick, reports on the condition of the records prior to
World War Il: 281
Part I, The Medieval Courts 145-47 (1962) (unpublished manuscript on file at the
Borthwick Institute, York). On the smaller number of active proctors, see K. Burns, id.

277, E.g., CP.E. 93 (1376).
278. Quoted in J. PURVIS, THE
Hall Fublications No. 2, 1952).
279. Id.
280, Id. at 7.
281. Id. at 8.
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The conditions of storage left very much to be desired; in general,
files were roughly bound up in brown paper, and many documents
were rolled, crushed or folded into bundles, and thrust much too
closely together on the shelves; a large number suffered damage,
either from damp or from nearness to the heat of the pipes which
warmed the Strong Rooms in winter, or from the rough folding or
the constriction of the strings with which they were tied; all suffered
severely from dirt, the accumulation of a thick coat of fine black dust.
Old files of which the strings had burst, allowing the members to
be scattered, had been gathered up hastily and made into bundles
and thrust away into any handy nook on the shelves, where they
remained unwanted and undisturbed £or year after year. As documents steadily accumulated, the congestion became worse, and there
was never time for any systematic arrangement or even inspection
by the Registry clerks, and the contents of the Registry became more
and more unknown.
Another possible source of essentially random loss is moving.
Prior to the removal of the records to the Borthwick, there are two
recorded moves, one in I 790, the other around 1840.282 The custody
of the records, moreover, .was the personal responsibility of the
registrar, and during the earlier period before there was a formal
registry office, they may well have been kept in his house. Each transfer from old to new registrar would have been an occasion for loss.
In sum, while the evidence is not completely conclusive, it does
point to a random process of survival of these records. 283
The sratistical techniques that I have employed are relatively
simple. In note 63, I have calculated the confidence intervals for the
proportion that each major type of case in the sample bears to the
whole. The technique may be illustrated by supposing that we have
a tub containing a very large number of balls of different colors.
Rather than counting all the balls to determine the proportion of
balls of each color to all the_ rest, we take a random sample of 100
balls and discover that 30 are red. If we rely on the sample for the
proposition that exactly 30 per cent of all the balls are red, our
chances of being right are very low. On the other hand if we rely
282. Id. at 7.
283. One more doubt: The surviving act books for the latter part of the fourteenth
and the fifteenth centuries indicate that the court heard between 50 and 100 cases
a year that would have had cause papers. See, e.g., [Dean &: Chapter Library, York]
M2(b)l (about 30 cases over a six-month period); K. Burns, supra note 276, at 167
(modal figure between 90-100 for six years in fifteenth century). The small number of
sets of papers that survive from the first three decades of the century means either that
the court was hearing far fewer cases at this time or that time bas been less kindly
to the older records. If the latter is the case, then we do not have a i-andom sample of
cases from the whole century but only one from, say, each decade, The only type of case
that shows any marked difference in proportion over the decades, however, is benefice
(see note 111 supra), and here our statistical technique has taken into account the
difference in decades (see discussion infra).
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on the sample for the proposition that somewhere between 20 per
cent and 40 per cent of the balls in the underlying population are
red, our chances of being right are much higher. In fact, by consulting
standard statistical tables,284 we discover that we will be right more
than 19 out of 20 times.
The figures given in note 63 are based on an assumption that we
are willing to be ·wrong one out of ten times (a confidence coefficient
of .90). Given that confidence coefficient and a sample of roughly 250
cases, the standard statistical tables tell us within what range (confidence interval) the proportions in the sample of cases represent the
actual proportions in the underlying population of cases. Selection
of a higher confidence coefficient would have resulted in wider confidence intervals; selection of a lower coefficient, in narrower intervals.
Raising or lowering the confidence coefficient by .05, however,
changes most of the intervals by only a few percentage points.
The technique involved in note 111 is a bit more complicated.
Suppose we have that same tub of colored balls and suppose this time
that we have some reason to believe that 50 per cent of them are red.
We draw a random sample of 100 balls and come up with 30 red balls.
This is surprising, but before we reject our theory that half of the
balls are red, we want to test to see what the chances are that a random draw of balls from a population, 50 per cent of whic:4 are red,
would yield only 30 per cent red balls. A most useful statistic for
doing this is chi2 • Chi8 can be calculated for any sample of decent size
wliere the expected value (50/50 in our balls case) and the actual
value (30 /70) of the statistics we wish to examine are known. From
there the calculation of the probability that the divergence between
actual and expected could have arisen by chance becomes a matter of
consulting standard tables.285
In note 111 we wished to determine what the chances were that
the absence of benefice cases in the years 1390-1399 was caused by
chance. On the basis of the number of benefice cases in the preceding
decades we would expect that 13 per cent of the cases in this decade
would be benefice cases. Thus, we would expect to find 9 benefice
cases in a random sample of 72 cases, and, in fact, we find none.
Since a sample size of 72 is quite large enough for the calculation of
chi 3 , we apply the following formula:

(Ob - Eb) 2

(Oo - Eo) 2

Eb

Eo

X2=------I-----284. E.g., W. DIXON &: F. MAsSEY, INTRODUCTION TO STATISIICAL ANALYSIS 413-16
(Tables A-9a to A-9d) (2d ed. 1957). More on confidence intervals for proportions may
be found in id. at 81-82.
285. E.g., id. at 386-87 (Table A-6b). See generally id. at 221-27; H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL
STATISTICS 212-21 (1960).
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= the number of benefice cases observed in the sample
= the number of other (nonbenefice) cases observed

= the number of benefice cases expected

0
Ea = the number of other cases expected
0

(0 - 9) 2
(72 - 63)2
"l.2=---+----=10.3
9
63
Consultation of the tables reveals that a chi2 statistic for a proportion (one degree of freedom) will be greater than 7.9 only I in 200
times and greater than 10.8 only 1 in 1000 times. Thus, the chances
that we would get a sample with no benefice cases drawn from a
population with 13 per cent benefice cases appears to be about I in
1000, It is far more probable that our expectation was mistaken and
that the proportion of benefice to other cases heard in the 1390-1399
decade was far smaller than it had been in the previous decades of
the century.
APPENDIX B
"Brief' for the Defendant in John of Elham, c.
Alice, daughter of Richard Cissor [Tailor?] 280
Ad informacionem domini Judicis ad sentenciandum in causa matrimoniali Inter J ohannem de Elham petentem et Aliciam filiam
Ricardi Cissoris de dovor' rem tentem, lecto libello et contestaciop.e
ad eundem, recitatis attestacionibus partis actricis, inspiciantur intime
excepciones ex parte rea proponite quarum prima est de diversitate,
contrarietate seu singularitate forme contractus quam testes exprimunt que ex ipsis deposicionibus dare colligitur prout in dicta
prima excepcione vel eius racione rubricatur.
ff. secunda excepcio vel racio de contrarietate et periurio eorundem

testium super repugnancia personarum presencium in clicto contractu
eodem modo colligitur et rubricatur.
ff. tercia, scilicet, de diversitate loci in quo dicitur contractus cele-

bratus a sedentibus, dare liquet. Hii sunt defectus evidentes primarum attestacionum.
ff. Quarta excepcio que facta est super violencia in dicto contractu

mulieri adhibita probatur per iiij 0 r testes, scilicet, per Garth, Adam,
Johannem, Luciam, in suis deposicionibus sic figitur hec [sic]
littera "a,"-Quod autem dicitur et allegatur pro parte actrice quod
286. Sede Vacante Scrapbook No. III, at 62 (No. 131) (Cathedral Library, Canterbury). See notes 197-218 supra and accompanying text. Extensions and modernization
of punctuation have been made without comment. The capitalization, except at the
beginning of sentences, strives to be faithful to the original. Additions to the text arc
indicated in square b,rackcts ([ ]), conjectural readings in diamond brackets (( )),
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hec excepcio et ipsius probacio non subsistit, eo quod est articulus
primo contrarius super quo non possunt testes produci post publicas
attestaciones, verum dicunt sed male discemunt. Sunt enim iiij0 t
genera articulorum quantum ad materiam presentem considerandi
[sic]: idem articulus vel penitus contrarius, talis, scilicet, qui primum
penitus et directe interimat, et super neutro istorum potest fieri
product~o post attestaciones publicas super primo, ut de testibus, c.
veniens, secundo [X 2.20.38.12], et de probacionibus, iuravit [X
2.19.6], cum suis concordanciis. Est et articulus penitus a primo
diversus [sed] non conttarius, et est quattus articulus ex primo dependens, primum supponens et aliquid adiciens primo, [sed] non
ipsum penitus interimens, ut de testibus, c. tam litteris, § quia vero
super matrimonio [X 2.20.23], et de fide instrumentorum, cum Johannes [X 2.22.10], cum suis concordanciis. Et super istis duobus
articulis bene admittuntur testes post attestaciones publicas super
primis articulis, sicut notat de testibus, fratemitatis, in glossa super
novis [X 2.20.17]. Talis est casus quem pre manibus habemus.
Excepcio enim violencie supponit formam contractus affuisse sed
substanciam defuisse, scilicet, consensum, qui locum non habet ubi
coactio intercedit, ut de sponsalibus, cum locum [X 4.1.14]. Nee est
racio aliqua quare non ita bene possit probari post attestaciones
publicas, absencia consensus vel animi, sicut absencia corporis. Nam
sicut potest contrahi matrimonium per presentem consensum corpore
absente, ut per nuncium vel epistolam, sic potest deficere inter
presentes si consensus absit. Sicut enim furiosus dicitur absens animo,
licet presens corpore, ut ff. de regulis iuris, sic non vocem, § furiosus
[Digest 50.17.40], sic et coactus dicitur absens, scilicet, animo qui
requiritur in matrimonio, licet presens sit corpore. Probatur ulterius
quad medius testis viri non interfuit per iiij 0 r qua testes predictos a
pucto "b," et licet sit negativa, quia tamen limitatur per certum factum, tempus et locum multum dicitur movere iudicem inter alia,
secus si cetera vaga et indiscreta, nullo certo facto, tempore, et loco
determinata, qualis est quod <is> numquam contraxit vel citatus
non exstitit, que probari non potest.
ff. probantur etiam verba mulieris dissensum denotantia. Ubi ipsi
instant, dantes quod non usque sunt verba negativa, quod <verende[?] > est dicere et contra matrimoniam manifeste. Ut notat Goffredus, titulus de probacionibus, § debet enim, <verso>: "Item
factum negativum probari non potest sed dictum negativum. Sic de
probacionibus, c. tercio [X 2.19.5], de desponsacione impuberum, ex
litteris [X 4.2.11].''287 Et est racio quia omries circumstancie et
287. The quotation from Geoffrey is exact except that the citations have been
expanded and a citation to Gratian's Decretum (causa 31, questio 2, c, 4) has been
omitted. See GEOFFREDUS TRANENSIS, supra note 198, tit. de probacionibus, § debet enim.
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cause sciencie possunt concurrere in dicta negativo que in dicta af•
firmativo, videlicet, loci, temporis, personarum, et alie infinite. Pro•
batur ulterius quod publica vox et fama in villa Dovor' [est] quod
dolus et violencia intercesserunt in dicta facto et quod testes corrupti
ad perhibendum falsum testimonium exstiterunt, que fama equipol•
lens uni testi et unus peroptime deposuit de corrupcione. Predicta
vox et fama probatur per omnes testes a pucto "c."
ff. Quod de eodem facto deponunt primi testes et secundi manifestat
ydemptitas loci, diei et hore, presencia earumdem personarum, unitas
contractus in quern omnes concurrunt quoad formam, licet secundi
adiciant primis quoad substanciam, et quoad in Iitteris <remtentiam> reliqua supleat riligio [sic] iudicantis si placet.

